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Eros, Paideia and Arête: The Lesson of Plato’s Symposium 
 
Jason St. John Oliver Campbell 
 
ABSTRACT 
Commentators of Plato’s Symposium rarely recognize the importance of 
traditional Greek conceptions of Eros, paideia and arête in understanding Plato’s critique 
of the various educational models presented in the dialogue. I will show how Plato 
contests these models by proposing that education should consist of philosophy. On this 
interpretation, ancient Greek pedagogy culminates in a philosophical education. For this 
new form of education, the dialogical model supplants the traditional practices of kléos 
and poetic mimēsis, inextricably bound to archaia paideia and traditional forms of 
education.  Plato’s Socrates is searching for knowledge and immortality through an 
application of the philosophical method, one that relies on a conception of Eros and 
propagation. For Plato’s Socrates, it is through Eros that ancient Greek paideia educates 
in matters of arête, but eros is not a passion for kléos or for a beautiful young man.  
Rather, eros is the passion for Beauty itself, a passion that is pursued through 
philosophical conversation with another, a life of arête. Thus, our investigation serves to 
define and criticize the various educational models and defend the claim that philosophy 
is best suited for educating the citizens of Athens. 
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General Introduction  
 
 Plato’s Symposium differs from the other dialogues insofar as it lacks direct 
exchange between speaker and interlocutor, except for a minor episode between Socrates 
and Agathon. The Symposium, a series of speeches paying tribute to Eros, poses a 
number of difficulties for modern readers. A total of seven speeches are given, six of 
which pay homage to Eros. Alcibiades’ speech, however, the final speech of the dialogue, 
diverges from this objective. Rather than praising Eros, Alcibiades provides a eulogy to 
Socrates, which has led some commentators to dismiss it as a digression. The speech of 
Alcibiades also disrupts the tone of the previous six speeches, insofar as the other 
speakers have agreed to temper their consumption of alcohol yet Alcibiades is very 
drunk. Nonetheless, Alcibiades’ speech addresses key points of discussion, which 
suggests that despite his drunkenness, much of what is said echoes certain themes of the 
other speeches. For example, Alcibiades supports the traditional model of education, 
wherein the lover pursues the beloved. The beloved is able to receive an education 
because he is the object of desire. While this conception conforms to five of the six 
speeches it is in stark opposition to the educational model proposed by Diotima. Thus, 
despite his drunkenness, Alcibiades and the other five speakers, excluding Diotima, agree 
on how the education of the youth is to be undertaken.  
The link between love and education, in virtue, requires the modern reader to 
examine what constituted education in classical Athens, especially how paideia included 
an erotic component. Ancient texts provide a number of clues that help the modern reader 
solve the puzzle of the relations between Eros, paideia and arête. 
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Socrates remarks in the Republic that traditional paideia consists of gymnastikē 
for the body and mousikē for the soul; thus, our analysis begins with an investigation of 
mousikē, which includes poetry. We find that poetry was used to teach virtue through its 
celebration of kléos, the remembered glory or renown of epic heroes. Mimēsis, or the 
practice of “imitation,” functions as the vehicle wherein the kléos of an epic hero is used 
to teach Athenian boys virtue.  
In the Republic, Socrates includes tragedy in criticizing how poetry fails to serve 
as the vehicle and occasion of paideia. But we also know this from Aristophanes’ play, 
the Frogs, where Euripides says that “poets are teachers of men” (1053 ff). Socrates, 
however, denies this claim to knowledge insofar as an education in poetry, including 
tragedy, takes feeling good as attesting to the truth of what is said. 
The importance of the body not only in its reaction to poetry, but also as a part of 
traditional paideia becomes clearer when we turn to these ancient texts that celebrate the 
institution of sunousia. Evidence about the erotic component of paideia also comes from 
Aeschines’ Against Timarchos, which records important information about 
homosexuality, law and education, to determine that sunousia is not the same as or 
merely the practice of pederasty.  
The importance of sunousia is also evident in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in which 
he employs the metaphor of the erastēs in inspiring one’s love of Athens. His speech 
gives us yet another valuable insight into Athenian education. Through his speech we 
understand the significance education plays in the construction of both his metaphor and 
its ability to reach a diverse audience. 
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No discussion of education — especially among those familiar with the dialogues 
of Plato — could proceed without consideration of the educational function of the 
Sophists. We, then, turn our focus to Plato’s Protagoras and his textual criticism of 
Simonides’ poem, noting the habit of sophists to appeal to poetic verse rater than justify 
their arguments. We conclude our discussion of sophistry by demonstrating how Socrates 
is able to launch an attack against the sophists and their claim to educate one in matters of 
virtue.  
Athenians had substantial faith in the intellectual abilities of the democratic polis, 
which attests to the fact that public discourse was inextricably tied to it. The speeches of 
Athenian leaders, typical addressed the polis directly, and served as the primary form of 
communication. Thus, for the ancient Greeks, the democratic polis served as a locus of 
intellectual power and authority. 
Armed with these insights, we return to Plato’s Symposium. In the final two 
chapters of this analysis we discuss the correlation between the speakers and the 
educational models that they represent, all vying for dominance. Diotima and her 
discussion of the “ladder of love”, serves as an alternative educational model: one equally 
accessible to men and women, one emphasizing the lover rather than the beloved and 
most notably, one defending a philosophical education. That Socrates represents this new 
educational model is the moving force behind the speech of Alcibiades. Despite 
Alcibiades’ appreciation of Socrates’ strange way of talking about virtue, Alcibiades 
ultimately — as his disgraceful end attests — is not moved by his love for Socrates to 
pursue an education in virtue. But presumably Plato was, for we learn about Socrates’ 
plan in transforming Eros, paideia and arête in ancient Greece.
 4
 
 
Chapter One 
 
Archaia Paideia: Mousikē and Gymnastikē 
Introduction 
       In discussing Ancient Greek education (paideia), it is necessary to distinguish the old 
educational system (archaia paideia),1 or simply Old Education from New Education, as 
these educational systems subscribe to different pedagogical starting points.2 Since this 
investigation serves to particularize the discussion of paideia, the general term “paideia” 
will not be used in an unqualified sense. The general use of the term for the purposes of 
this analysis, would only serve to confuse the discussion, as it is my suggestion that the 
complex structure of Ancient Greek education cannot adequately be defined under an all-
encompassing term. Moreover, in particularizing the discussion of paideia one gains 
greater insight into the intricacies of the Ancient Greek educational system3 and one is 
                                                 
1 The term Old Education or Philosophy proper, also know as the Superior Argument, in contrast 
to New Education or “sophistry”, also known as the inferior Argument, is fully explicated in Aristophanes’ 
Clouds. The term Old Education is a translation of the Ancient Greek (ἡ ἀρχαἱα παιδεἱα) (Clds. 961). I 
use scare quotes around sophistry because Aristophanes has biased his argument in favor of Old Education 
rather than New Education. 
2 See Kevin Robb’s essay, “Asebeia and Sunousia: The Issues Behind the Indictment of  
Socrates” in Plato's Dialogues, New Studies and Interpretations. ed. Gerald Press, Lanham, Md.: Rowman 
& Littlefeid. 1993. p. 86-89. In a young boy’s formative years — from birth to fifteen he is taught under the 
Old Educational system, particularly in mousikē and gymnastikē. As Robb notes, the term meirakion 
applies to young men between the ages of 15 and 21. During the meirakion years, if he so aspires, he may 
begin to study under the New Education system. Hence, there is no overlap in the ages of those studying 
under the Old and New educational systems, the former beginning after the meirakion years, the latter 
beginning much earlier. It is important, moreover, not to conflate meirakion (young men 15-21) with the 
military training of the ephēboi, of the fourth century “mature youths” typically 18-21. For a discussion of 
the ephēboi, See Scanlon, Thomas F. Eros and Greek Athletics New York, Oxford University Press 2002. 
p. 87-88. See also Werner Jaeger. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. New York, Oxford University 
Press, Vol. 3. 1944. p. 248-250 for Plato’s account of the educational periods of children or Plato’s Laws 
Bk. VII. Ages 1-3 (788-793d6) ages 3-6 (793d7-794d2), the separation of boys and girls at age six (794c3) 
and so on. 
3 As the discussion continues, the intricacies of the Ancient Greek educational system will be fully 
explained. The distinction between the Old and the New forms of education, the relevance of poetry, 
theater, literacy and political life, the transition from an oral to literate society, combined with the comic 
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better equipped to understand the shift in the pedagogical paradigm from the 6th to the 4th 
century BCE, i.e., the shift from Old Education to New Education. This is not, however, 
to suggest that these systems of education are in any sense antithetical. In fact, throughout 
the latter half of the 5th century, boys with aspirations of becoming politicians, after 
having completed their traditional education, had the option of entering political life, 
which required they become proficient speakers (rhētores) and continue their education 
under the guidance of sophistai or the “cleaver ones.”4 There was no essential conflict 
between the traditional and contemporary education these young men received.  
In discussing the nature of Ancient Greek education, then, I will (1) identify and 
discuss two key components of archaia paideia, viz., mousikē and gymnastikē, (2) 
discuss the importance of sunousia, or the “association” between an older lover (erastēs) 
and his younger beloved (erōmenos), (3) argue for a distinction between sunousia and the 
practice of paederasty (4) incorporate the discussion of poetry into an analysis of 
theatrical performance and finally (5) discuss the correlation between the teachers of 
letters, (grammatistēs), and sophists, given the change in the political arena after the 
death of Pericles.5 It is only after these preliminary points are addressed ― and a fuller 
 
festivals all play an important role in understanding the significance of the term paideia. As such, a general 
analysis of Ancient Greek paideia, one not accounting for theatrical performance, or the role of Old 
Comedy in the 6th and 5th centuries generalizes rather than particularizes the analysis. 
4 In Plato’s Protagoras Hippocrates asks Socrates if he can accompany him to Callias’ house, as 
Protagoras is in Athens. Of interest to this discussion are two important passages (316c) and (312b). In 
(316c) Socrates, speaking on behalf of Hippocrates, informs Protagoras of his desire to learn under the new 
educational system, in fact, Protagoras is a self-professed sophist (317b2). Before this passage, however, in 
(312b) Socrates asks Hippocrates if he intends on gaining the same education from Protagoras as he 
received from his educators under the old system, thereby, raising the possibility that the two educational 
systems were not in any essential conflict. 
5 See Jeffery Henderson’s essay, “The Dēmos and the Comic Competition” in Nothing To Do With 
Dionysos: Athenian Drama In Its Social Context. Princeton University Press. 1990. p. 279-280. For 
Henderson, and ancient scholars alike, the death of Pericles marked a significant change in how the dēmos 
were governed. Prior to his death, the aristocracy assumed leadership; men of good repute, privilege and 
wealth controlled the dēmos. After the death of Pericles, however, men like Kleon, were able to rise to 
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conception of paideia purposed ― that we might begin an analysis of the Platonic 
dialogues as a response to the educational practices of the Ancient Greeks. The 
concluding two chapters, then, will analyze Plato’s Symposium as a critique of the 
traditional forms of classical education, each character representing one aspect of Ancient 
Greek education. 
Mousikē: The First Component of Archaia Paideia
 Within the Ancient Greek educational system, the education of a child, if it was to 
be successful, must seek to nurture both the child’s mind and body, as Protagoras 
properly states, “they [the children] are sent to trainers, so that a good mind may have a 
good body to serve it” (Prot. 326b6).6 The fact that one’s introduction to mousikē (the art 
of the Muses) is prior to one’s introduction to gymnastikē is in no sense an arbitrary 
correspondence, as Glaucon explains to Adimantus.7 Moreover, it should be noted that 
mousikē also includes poetry as well as tales and fables. Furthermore, Socrates explains 
to Glaucon that mousikē and gymnastikē “will preside over the appetitive part which is 
the mass of the soul…and the most insatiate by nature of wealth” (Rep. 442a3-6). 
Without ever using the term, Socrates is suggesting that the aim of one’s educational 
training in mousikē and gymnastikē will contribute to one’s “self-control” or 
(sōphrosunē).8  
                                                                                                                                                 
power. Unlike Pericles, Kleon affiliated himself with the dēmos, as a member of the dēmos. For the 
Athenian stranger in Plato’s Laws, this affiliation is absolutely disastrous, i.e., not the particular affiliation 
of Kleon with the dēmos but any leader’s affiliation with the dēmos — or any case in which the leader does 
not differentiate himself from the dēmos. See Plato’s Laws, Bk. II, (658e5-659c8) and his critique of the 
Sicilian’s manner of judging the comedic competition. 
6 See also (Prot. 312b), (Laws. 795d6-795e), (Rep. 376e-3), (Clds. 960-982). 
7 See (Rep. Bk.2 376e4).   
8 If, as Socrates claims, mousikē and gymnastikē “preside over the appetitive portion of the soul”, 
which is prone to indulgence and excess, then insofar as these components regulate the appetitive portion, 
they directly modify the behavior of the individual, thereby allowing the individual to exercise restraint or 
 7
                                                                                                                                                
 The first component of traditional Greek education, mousikē, plays a great 
significance in preliterate 6th century Greece, so much so that the Athenian stranger in 
Plato’s Laws suggests, “So by an uneducated man we shall mean one who has no choric 
training, and by educated man one whose choric training has been thorough” (Laws, Bk. 
II, 654b). The relevance of this claim is at least twofold. On the one hand, archaia 
paideia is an established pedagogical devise for educating Athenian boys prior to the 
advent of literacy in the 4th century BCE.9 Insofar as mousikē facilitates the education of 
Athenian boys prior to a formalized school system — it offers both the youth and the 
society an opportunity to cultivate morality. On the other hand, and more importantly, the 
role mousikē plays in the formal education of Athenian youth directly contributes to 
honing their intellectual abilities, or at least those abilities prized by archaia paideia. The 
metaphorical association between the intellect and the role of mousikē is brilliantly 
illustrated in an often-overlooked passage in Plato’s Symposium. Scholars have often 
dismissed as merely comical Alcibiades’ contribution to the discussion in the Symposium 
but it is my suggestion that his statements are of the utmost importance if one is to 
understand the educational practices of the Ancient Greeks. Moreover, while I agree that 
 
“self-control” in appeasing the appetitive portion. Hence, an individual properly educated — with a good 
body to serve a good soul — must also exhibit sōphrosunē. Nevertheless, the inverse relationship is not 
true, as merely having a good body does not necessitate proper education, as is clearly the case during 
Socrates’ discussion with Charmides, in the Charmides.  
9 The specifics concerning the advent of literacy in Ancient Greece are debated. By literacy we 
mean at least those citizens responsible for conducting the business of the polis who transmit and expand 
their culture can read and write. Our concern is not with the specific but the general transition from a 
preliterate Greece, generally considered 6th century Greece to a “fully” literate Greece, generally thought to 
have firmly established its roots during the early to mid 4th century BCE.  For a specific discussion of this 
transition see Kevin Robb’s Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
1994. See also Alfred Burns. “Athenian Literacy in the Fifth Century B.C.” Journal of the History of Ideas 
Vol.42, No 3, (Jul.-Sep., 1981), p. 371-387. 
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his introduction (215a4), in a state of delirious drunkenness, is comical,10 I suggest that 
something more serious is being said:  
And aren’t you [Socrates] a piper as well? I should think 
you were ― and a far more wonderful piper than 
Marsyas…the only difference between you and Marsyas is 
that you can get the same effect without any instrument at 
all ― with nothing but a few simple words, not even poetry 
(Symp. 215b5-215c9).  
 
His discussion focuses on the relationship between mousikē and the intellect. The first 
component of archaia paideia, mousikē, is not merely beneficial for the practical 
purposes of instrument playing and entertaining, as is evident in Eryximachus’ dismissal 
of the flute girls (176e3) prior to the beginning of their discussion. The practice of 
“imitation” or (mimēsis) in Ancient Greek poetry, coincides with a conception of the 
remembered glory or renown (kléos) of poetic heroes.11 It is also important to recognize 
that mousikē is necessarily tied to a very oral tradition of recitation and performance. 
Mimēsis, then, is as integral a component of mousikē as mousikē is to understanding 
archaia paideia. That is to say, once the distinction between technē and mousikē are 
 
10 See Andrea W. Nightingale. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995. p. 172-192. The relevance of Old Comedy will be 
discussed later in this analysis but Nightingale reminds us of the two essential components of Old Comedy, 
which are the ridiculous and the serious. Serious matters usually deal with politics and education while 
there is no constraint to the ridiculous. It is my suggestion, then, that instead of disregarding Alcibiades’ 
speech as superfluous we need to view his speech as an exercise in Old Comedy. The ridiculousness of his 
drunken state in no way undermines the credibility of his speech, as in the introductory passages he is 
clearly arguing for the supremacy of Socrates’ music, i.e., philosophy, over the traditional mousikē. Note 
also, the important distinction between music without words (technē) and music accompanied by words 
(mousikē). See Edward Lippman. “The Sources and Development of the Ethical View of Music in Ancient 
Greece”. The Musical Quarterly, Vol, 49, No. 2 (Apr., 1963), 195-196, for further elaboration on this 
distinction. With this distinction between technē and mousikē in mind, one is better equipped to understand 
the relevance of Alcibiades’ emphasis in saying, “not even poetry” (215c9). That is, not even with the 
accompaniment of words is mousikē a match for the music that Socrates is able to produce. This claim does 
not essentially serve as a critique of mousikē as it serves as a compliment to the music that Socrates is 
capable of producing—philosophy—which produces the same effect, only Socrates is able to achieve this 
end without the aid of a musical instrument. 
11 The conception of kléos is closely tied to honor, which will factor in our discussion in the final 
two chapters of this analysis.   
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clear, and one realizes that the epic poems were typically set to music, then it is apparent 
that mousikē serves as a vehicle, wherein the morals of these poems are able to take hold 
of an individual’s soul. More practically, mimēsis became an invaluable tool in 
education.12  
Mousikē and Arête: An Education in Virtue  
 The practical needs of education in Greek antiquity also placed a heavy emphasis 
on morality, in particular the moral education of its citizenry through poetic mimēsis. 
This capacity for imitation, especially concerning the kléos of epic heroes, nurtured the 
moral foundation of the dēmos. Hence, the dēmos came to understand virtue, arête, 
during this preliterate phase of Ancient Greece, through poetic mimēsis. The poet — 
divinely inspired — set out to educate the dēmos on matters of morality and virtue. It was 
they that possessed the gift of muthos, which functions as a form of “speech that ‘simply 
speaks itself; it preserves, without ‘authorial intrusion’, an ancient and traditional wisdom 
that belongs simultaneously to everyone and to no one” (Waugh, 2002b, p. 214). The 
importance of the poet’s role in paideia is clear in the following lengthy quote from 
Hesiod, worth quoting in its entirety since it is important for the later discussion of belief 
based on mimēsis as divinely inspired.  
And these were the first words of all  
The goddesses spoke to me,  
the Muses of Olympia, daughters of Zeus 
of the aegis: 
                                                 
12 See Kevin Robb’s Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
1994. Chapter 8. Robb points out that prior to widespread literacy throughout Ancient Greece where texts 
were available to those with the inclination and resources to purchase them, these individuals, if they were 
to remember the stories of Homer would have to commit the epics to memory. Clearly, rhythm both in the 
metric foot of the line (or meter) and in the instrumentation of the accompanying lyre, typically, would 
contribute to an individual’s memory. Thus, the practical purpose of mimēsis was in its ability to aid in the 
retention of detailed information. As the discussion continues, we will address Plato’s disapproval of poetic 
mimēsis.  
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“You shepherds of the wilderness, poor fools,  
nothing but bellies,  
we know how to say many false things 
that seem like true sayings, 
but we know also how to speak the truth  
when we wish to.” 
So they spoke, these mistresses of words, 
daughters of great Zeus, 
and they broke off and handed me a staff 
of strong growing  
olive shoot, a wonderful thing; 
they breathed a voice into me, 
a power to sing the story of things 
of the future, and the past (my emphasis), (Hesiod, Theogony, 
25-32). 
  
Summarizing the importance of poetic mimēsis Lippman writes, 
so the epic, in turn, originally themselves sung, became the 
examples furnishing moral inspiration to successive 
generations. Also, the glory to which a hero aspires and for 
which he is willing to sacrifice his life is really a musical 
one, for it consists in the poetic celebration that 
immortalizes his deed…music and poetry have their 
highest function in the glorification of the hero and the 
education that is based on this (Lippman, 1963, p. 198). 
 
 Later in the Symposium, Eryximachus, the physician, suggests, “the art of music 
[is] to create harmony by resolving the discord between the treble and the bass…And just 
as we saw that the concord of the body was brought about by the art of medicine, so this 
other harmony is due to the art of music” (Sym. 187b-187c2). Eryximachus’ claim is 
more than a simple correlation, insofar as he testifies to music’s ability in procuring 
health,13 exemplified in the following quote from Hesiod’s Theogony,  
 
13 See Plato’s Laws Bk. VII (790d1-790e4). The Athenian stranger explains to Clinias that mothers 
with newborn infants experiencing colic may “put a spell on their babies” while lulling them to sleep. He 
continues, “the encouragement of placidity of temper will play a prominent part in the development of 
moral excellence” (Laws Bk. VII, 791c7-9). I have already discussed the role of poetic mimēsis and its 
contribution to the moral excellence of the Athenian dēmos, note however, that one’s moral education 
begins from infancy — and the vehicle of its transmission is, again, mousikē. See also, Hesiod. Theogony. 
trans. by Richard Lattimore. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 1959.  
 11
                                                                                                                                                
So it is from the Muses, and from Apollo 
of the far cast,  
that there are men on earth who are poets, 
and players on the lyre. 
The lord are from Zeus; but blessed 
is that one whom the Muses 
love, for the voice of his mouth runs  
and is sweet, and even 
when a man has sorrow fresh 
in the troublement of his spirit  
and is struck to wonder over the grief 
in his heart, the singer, 
the servant of the Muses singing 
the glories of ancient  
men, and the blessed gods 
who have their homes on Olympos, 
makes him presently forget his cares, he no longer 
remembers 
sorrow, for the gifts of the goddesses 
soon turn his thoughts elsewhere (Lattimore, 1959, 94-
103).14
 
 
It is because of the poets that men are able to forget their troubles. Music, then, whether spoken or sung, 
serves as a form of therapy. It also allows us, as human beings, to experience an epiphany. In Plato’s 
Charmides, Socrates facetiously explains to Charmides that the cure for his headache is a charm, which 
accompanies a leaf that must be eaten. Socrates further explains, “without the charm the leaf would be of 
no avail” (Charm. 155e5-8), thereby reinforcing the claim that mousikē has the ability to cure physical 
aliment. Finally, see Aristotle. The Politics. trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1948. p. 345 
(Politics Bk. VIII, V, § 24). Aristotle argues that if mousikē has power or control over the soul it should be 
studied and taught to the young. It is also interesting to note that “music therapy” in the 21st century is 
being “prescribed” by physicians as an alternative to traditional Western medicine. See Gold et al., recent 
study, “Effects of music therapy for children and adolescents with psychopathology: a meta-analysis” in 
Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry. 45(6):1054-1063, September 2004. 
14 Ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος 
ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί, 
ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες ▪ ὃ δ᾽ ὄλβιος, ὅν τινα Μοῡσαι 
φίλωνται ▪ γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή ▪  
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδέι θυμῷ  
ἄζηται κραδίην ἀκαχήμενος, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὸς 
Μουσάων θεράπων κλέεα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων 
ὑμνήσῃ μάκαράς τε θεοὺς οῒ ῎Ολυμπον ἔχουσιν, 
αΐψ᾽ ὃ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ τι κηδέων 
μέμνηται ▪ ταχέως δέ παρέτραπε δῶρα θεάων (94-103). 
With respect to the relationship between mousikē and health or mousikē as a “charm” for health the quote 
from Theogony may provide an example. Alliteration and assonance occur in lines (94-95)…Ἀπόλλωνος 
ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ and ἔασιν ἐπὶ (alliterating the “ε”) and finally χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί (emphasizing the 
 12
                                                                                                                                                
 
For the Ancient Greeks, then, education through music, played a crucial role in 
developing an individual’s ability to attain health, “knowledge”, and virtue ― health in 
the sense of harmony, as discussed by Eryximachus in the Symposium, (187b-187c2), 
“knowledge”, as illustrated in Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates, (215b5-215c9), and virtue 
through poetic mimēsis.15 Hence, without the contributions of mousikē Athenian youth 
would lack the necessary intellectual and moral education needed to live a virtuous life. 
 The Ancient Greeks did not conceive of poetry as we do, for we do not consider 
the primary purpose of poetry to be paideia.  For us, the pedagogical purpose of poetry, if 
it has one, is to contribute to a well-rounded education — i.e., one consisting of study in 
the liberal arts and sciences. For the ancient Greeks, however, “Homer [was] the educator 
of Hellas” (Rep. 10. 606e-607). Indeed, he deserved to be studied as a guide by which to 
regulate one’s whole life. For the ancient Greeks, then, poetry was an essential part of the 
education of Athenian citizens.16 Havelock nicely sums up the importance of poetry, and 
the civic function the poets served the Ancient Greek community: 
poetry is central in [Ancient Greek] educational theory…It 
is clear…that the poets in general and Homer in particular 
were not only considered as the source of instruction in 
ethics and administrative skills but also enjoyed a sort of 
 
/k/ of a voiced velar stop). The content is equally as important: Surely it is from the Muses and far-darting 
Apollo that there are men on earth who are poets and singers (my translation). 
15 Note, “knowledge” appears in scare quotes because what constitutes knowledge — and how one 
attains knowledge — is a major point of contention in Plato’s dialogue. In nearly every appearance, 
Socrates criticizes his interlocutor’s claim to knowledge, and the notion that one acquires knowledge 
through archaia paideia or sophistry. 
16 To be educated was to be sufficiently versed in the epic poems of Homer and to have choric 
training, as noted by the Athenian stranger (Laws, Bk. II, 654b). Moreover, the earliest forms of education 
for Athenian citizens were conveyed through the use of poetry, which was a gift of the gods transmitted 
through the Muses (Laws, Bk. II, 654a5). Hence, the conception of poetry throughout archaia paideia was 
one of divine inspiration — to question the truth or the intentions of the poet would in some sense be to 
challenge the gods themselves, and perhaps to jeopardize one’s own piety.  
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institutional status in Ancient Greek society (Havelock, 
1963, p. 27-29). 
 
Socrates’ Criticism of Traditional Paideia: 
 
 In constructing the ideal polis, Socrates sets out to investigate who will manage 
the task of educating the guardians (2.376c7). Glaucon, for the sake of argument, 
assumes Thrasymachus’ position, as he believes Thrasymachus has abandoned his 
position too easily (2.358b). Thrasymachus has defended the position that justice is the 
advantage of the strong over the weak (1.338c), (1.341a), that it is disadvantageous to be 
just, (1.343d), and it is conversely advantageous to be unjust (1.343e5). Support for 
Thrasymachus’ position is found throughout the poetic tradition, as Glaucon shows in the 
Republic.17 The following passage from Hesiod’s Works and Days, cited in book two of 
the Republic, exemplifies Thrasymachus’ position: 
Evildoing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking. 
Smooth is the way, and it lies near at hand and is easy to 
enter, But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from 
the first step (Works and Days, 287), (Rep. 2. c6-d1).  
 
Furthermore, Glaucon, in playing devil’s advocate, adds that “the height of injustice is to 
seem just without being so” (2.361a4) and that the unjust man “benefits his friends and 
harms his enemies” (2.362c). In essence, it is easier to be unjust than it is to be just. Since 
the guardians of the ideal polis must be educated in matters of justice, and there is such 
dispute as to how one should be educated, Socrates must first determine who the 
educators will be, if he is to derive a proper conception of justice.  
 Where in antiquity did this conception that it is easier to be unjust than just find 
its rationale? Socrates provides some insight: 
                                                 
17 See Republic (2.358a8-b1), (2.360c4-8), (2.362c), (2. 365b-c), (2.365e5-366a3). 
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All [of the poets] with one accord reiterate that soberness 
and righteousness are fair and honorable, to be sure, but 
unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice 
are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by 
convention disgraceful (2.364).   
 
While it is noted that righteousness is an honorable characteristic of human nature, it is 
also noted that it is attained with great effort. A similar critique is mounted in the 
Protagoras, wherein Socrates cites Hesiod, “The gods have put sweat on the path to 
virtue…The summit’s reached, Hard though it was, thenceforth the task of light to keep 
it” (Hesiod, Works and Days, 289), (340d-e). 
 As G.R.F. Ferrari writes,  
The poets tend to exalt virtue so high that the path to reach 
it comes to seem impossibly arduous, while the wheeling 
and dealing that goes on below they attest (even as they 
condemn it) to be more practicable and more likely to bring 
pleasure and reward in this life (Ferrari, 1989, p. 111).  
 
But Socrates’ criticisms of poetry and his arguments for its censorship focus on its 
role as the vehicle of education (Waugh, 1986, p. 5). How, then, was poetry used as a 
vehicle of education? For Plato, it is through mimēsis that the poet comes to teach the 
audience. Mimēsis can refer to the creative act of preserving someone’s tone or voice in 
writing a play.18 It can refer to the performer’s rendition of the written word and his 
ability, simultaneously to imitate and create within the confines of the text.19 But most 
importantly, for our specific discussion of Ancient Greek paideia, mimēsis refers to, “the 
over-all linguistic medium of the poet and his peculiar power through the use of this 
medium…to render an account of reality” (my emphasis), (Havelock, 1963, p. 25). This 
“rendering of reality” affects the beliefs of the audience, and as we know, affecting belief 
 
18 See Havelock, 1963, p. 22.  
19 See Havelock, 1963, p. 22-23. 
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is a staple in any educational model. Waugh writes, “For Socrates, the real problem with 
poetry lies in the mechanism by which it affects beliefs and behavior and in so doing 
accomplishes the task of education” (Waugh, 1986, p. 7).  
 How, then, is belief affected through poetic verse? Belief governs our conduct 
within the world. There is a direct relationship between belief, on the one hand and action 
on the other. Beliefs, however, are not fixed. We often change our beliefs and insofar as 
our beliefs are malleable, our actions are impressionable and subject to change also. It is 
of the greatest importance, then, that the most impressionable, viz., children, are 
protected from ideas that dogmatically fashion their beliefs, that is, beliefs which require 
no appeal to reason —  those that offer no justification and mandate conformity. The 
same demand to censor children from these concepts is evident throughout books two and 
three of Plato’s Republic (2.377b4-c), (2.380b6-c), and (3.395c-d).  
 In attempting to determine the appropriate pedagogical model responsible for the 
education of the guardians, Plato’s Socrates recognizes that it is from childhood and 
through the process of forming beliefs that ideas shape the nature and character of men. 
Thus, Socrates remarks: 
if [the guardians] imitate they should from childhood up 
imitate what is appropriate to them — men…but things 
unbecoming to free men they should neither do nor be 
clever at imitating…lest from the imitation they imbibe the 
reality (my italics) (3. 395.c-d).   
 
The initial critique launched at the poets manifests in the conception that through 
“imitation” or mimēsis the individual can “imbibe the reality”: through the process of 
mimēsis one’s belief is affected, whether as performer or member of the audience. Insofar 
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as belief influences action, to participate in imitation increases the likelihood that the 
individual will enact what is being represented.  
 The poets, then, have the specific obligation to ensure that their representation of 
the gods conforms in such a manner as not to jeopardize the piety of the performer or the 
members of the audience. Since poetry is a vehicle for education, and the function of 
education is to affect belief, and since the formation of belief corresponds to how an 
individual acts within the world, then a deficiency in education will increase the 
likelihood for delinquency or impiety (asebeia) during adulthood. Thus, Socrates sets out 
to illustrate the connection between poetry, on the one hand (as an educational tool) and 
delinquency and impiety on the other (as an effect of poetic education).  
 Ferrari observes that, “fantasy has an effect on the development of character” 
(Ferrari, 1989, p. 111). In book two of the Republic, Socrates illustrates that, according to 
Hesiod, Cronus took revenge against his father (2.378a). In the Euthyphro, Euthyphro 
mentions to Socrates, lest he forget, that Zeus also moved against his father (Cronus) for 
swallowing his brothers (6a). Thus, the belief, as acquired from Hesiod, is that one is 
justified in “punishing one’s father’s wrongdoings” (2.378b3). The truth of this concept 
has its basis in emotion, namely, retribution or revenge. As Waugh notes,  
truths communicated through poetry are not accepted 
because one has good reasons to accept them; they are 
believed because the poetry through which they are 
communicated generates positive emotions. That the poetry 
made its audience feel good is taken by them as attesting to 
the truth of its subject matter (Waugh, 1991, p. 53).  
 
Euthyphro, as a character within the dialogue, defends the argument that all just 
actions are pious, which is clearly false, and offers as a defense Zeus’ action to move 
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against Cronus. Euthyphro “feels” as though he is doing a pious act and this feeling 
translates into the truth of the matter. Socrates, however, attempts to illustrate not only to 
Euthyphro but to Athenians themselves that such justification is flawed — as all pious 
actions are just but not all just actions are pious, e.g., one may be justified in seeking 
vengeance for the death of a family member but may, at the same time, not be pious in 
committing an act of murder.20  Hence, Euthyphro may be just is moving against his 
father but it does not follow that he is also pious in such action. Euthyphro symbolizes 
this general misconception among Athenians, and Socrates’ critique of Euthyphro 
extends to a critique of Athenian culture and the poets for having instilled this conception 
through their characterization of the gods. 
Since there is a relationship between belief and action, it comes to no surprise that 
Euthyphro’s belief in Hesiod’s characterization of the gods, serves to justify his action to 
prosecute his father for inadvertently killing one of his laborers, who himself, in a state of 
drunkenness kills an innocent man (4c2). In defense of his actions, Euthyphro comments, 
“now they are enraged at me when I proceed against my father for wrongdoing, and so 
they contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and what they say about me” 
(6a). This is why Socrates notes: 
 
20 See Aeschylus. 1906. “Agamemnon” in Plays, J.M. Dent and Sons LTD, trans. G.M. Cookson 
with introduction by John Warrington. London, p. 189-253. In the first of the trilogy set of Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia, King Agamemnon has sacrificed his daughter prior to the Trojan war “A Father’s slaughterous 
hands foully imbrued, Hard by the altar, with her [his daughter’s] blood” (227-228). His wife and queen, 
Clytaemnestra, knows about their daughter’s murder — patiently waiting for Agamemnon to return home 
to seek her revenge, for a period of ten years. She stabs her husband, the king, three times (1559-1563) and 
revels in her blood-splattered clothing and his death (1563-1566). While she is clearly justified in avenging 
the slaughter of her daughter, her action is impious. This is the nature of the debate she has with the chorus. 
She asks, “Now in the name of Justice thou hurl’st down damnation…on my head…But when need was, 
durst cast no stone at him [Agamemnon]…who slew his own child, the darling of my womb…” (1590-
1599).  
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Neither must we admit at all…that the gods war with gods 
and plot against one another (Rep.2.378b7)…the battles of 
the gods in Homer’s verse are things that we must not 
admit into our city…For the young are not able to 
distinguish what is and what is not allegory (Rep.2.379d4-
7).  
 
It is important to censor the poets since in functioning as a vehicle of education, poetry 
affects the formation of belief, and as such determines one’s actions. If it is inappropriate 
for Euthyphro to seek to punish his father, then, one should banish those stories that 
glorify such conceptions, namely, the banishment of poetry.  
 For the poet’s audience feeling good is taken…as attesting to the truth of the 
subject matter (Waugh, 1991, p. 53). Ferrari expands and explains this observation: “A 
poetic performance…engages its participants not simply in the look but…in the whole 
‘feel’ of the human action that it portrays” (Ferrari, 1989, p. 109). The features that 
enable an effective performance of poetry have effects on the audience that leaves them 
thinking about appearance, not reality. It is this facet of the poetic performance that is 
simultaneously its greatest strength and weakness, in that the appearance is beneficial 
insofar as it is properly identified as a representation. Nevertheless, if the appearance of 
truth is believed to be true, a multitude of epistemological problems unravel.   
 Finally, one should note that with respect to Plato’s critique of poetry, insofar as 
Plato was successful in his attack, he sufficiently illustrated that poetry was unsuitable for 
contributing to the formation of one’s belief, while simultaneously preserving truth rather 
than appearance. Clearly, poetry is capable of contributing to the formation of belief but 
it appeals to feeling and appearance in the formation of one’s beliefs, rather than to fact, 
hence the role of metaphor in poetic verse.  
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If metaphor and imagery are tools used by the poet, and the purpose of metaphor 
and imagery are to color or accent rather than describe reality, then the poet cannot 
profess to educate, since the content of poetic education functions as an imitation and 
cannot make reality present to us. Hence, on a pedagogical stance, poetic mimēsis is not 
only incapable of contributing to knowledge, poetry misleads us into thinking appearance 
is reality, as Waugh writes,  
For an artwork constructs another “reality” in addition to 
the world we inhabit, but it does so using the “stuff” of this 
world, so that work of art is also a “representation” or 
“imitation” of the world. That art may use this “stuff,” that 
it can represent the world “out there” —that representation 
is possible—attests to the instability of “reality.” In 
representing what is “out there” the work represents it as 
unstable, because art can make another “reality” out of it, 
which is also malleable that we speak in vain of the correct 
version, interpretation, description, or reading of it (Waugh, 
1991, p. 56-57). 
 
It is no wonder that Socrates insists that poetry cannot be the vehicle of education 
as it lacks the capability — as such — to present reality.  As Havelock puts it: “Poetry is 
not so much non-functional as anti-functional…Poetry…indulges in constant illusionism, 
confusion and irrationality. This is what mimēsis ultimately is, a shadow show of 
phantoms” (Havelock, 1963, p. 25).  
Gymnastikē: The Second Component of Archaia Paideia 
 The second component of archaia paideia, gymnastikē, is of equal importance in 
the education of Athenian boys. In the seventh book of Plato’s Laws, the Athenian 
Stranger is discussing the nature of “physical culture” or gymnastikē with Clinias, 
wherein a participant of gymnastikē is a dancer (choreutēs) or wrestler (palaistēs) 
(795d8). With respect to dance, G.M. Sargeaunt writes,  
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there are three aspects of musical dancing in early times: it  
is used as a religious rite; it has a social value; and  
aesthetically it is delightful for those who take part in it and  
for those who look on (Sargeaunt. 1969, p. 110). 
 
The second component of gymnastikē, viz., wrestling or (palê) also plays an 
important role in archaia paideia, the first component of gymnastikē being the dance or 
(choros). Wrestling, too, is an essential component of Ancient Greek paideia, as young 
men would gather at the wrestling school or (palaestra) to receive their instructions. In 
fact, Socrates’ conversation with Charmides and Critias takes place in the wrestling 
school. Within the Charmides, the setting plays as significant a role as the dialogue itself. 
Wrestling and all forms of physical exercise serve not only to strengthen the body but 
also to cultivate the soul. In suggesting that Charmides should strip and show his soul, 
Socrates alludes to the conception that a noble body is accompanied by a noble soul 
(Waugh. 2002, p. 290). In a discussion with Glaucon, Socrates suggests, “And even the 
exercise and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his 
nature to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat diet 
and exercise only as a means to muscle” (Rep. Bk. III, 410b4-7). The proper purpose of 
gymnastikē was the cultivation of arête and sōphrosunē. Who, then, is the gymnastic 
educator? 
 The instructor of physical education is known as the pedotribe — 
(παιδοτρίβης). In his discussion of the pedotribe Marrou writes,  
The thing we know most about is the way wrestling was 
taught. The pedotribe used to teach the different positions 
or “figures” — σχήματα — in turn, and then the wrestler 
would use them in the actual match (Marrou. 1956, p. 175). 
 
 21
                                                
Physical exercise, in particular wrestling, is an essential tool in disciplining young boys, 
one that assists in one’s transition from boyhood into manhood. Many rules of conduct 
and discipline, however, govern the behavior of the boys while in the palaestra. These 
rules, too, are a staple of archaia paideia.21 It is, therefore, the responsibility of the boys 
to follow the instruction of the pedotribe, whether concerning technique or conduct. He is 
their mentor and they his students. This relationship between student and instructor will 
be discussed below. One need not forget that a great sense of pride and accomplishment 
in the instillment of courage and bravery during wartime directly reflected on the nature 
of this relationship. As a defense of archaia paideia, Philosophy proper comments, “It is 
my system of student tutoring [i.e., in the palaestra] that raised the men who fought so 
bravely at Marathon” (Clds. 986).  
 
21 See. Aristophanes. 2000. Clouds trans. Peter Meineck, with an introduction by Ian C. Storey. 
 Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company. p. 67. To illustrate the variety of rules that governed one’s 
conduct in the palaestra, Philosophy proper, representing archaia paideia, [and not what Plato or his 
character Socrates mean by philosophy] in an argument with Sophistry, explains the detailed regulations 
that must govern one’s conduct within the palaestra. This regulation were in place to ensure attention was 
paid to the education of the youth and that the youth understood and upheld proper decorum, rather than 
allowing the beautiful bodies of the students to distract from the coursework. Sexual temptation, within the 
palaestra  must have been great because even Socrates comments,  
 
All the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and at the moment…I 
caught a sight of the inwards of his [Charmides] garment, and took the 
flame. Then I could no longer contain myself…I felt that I had been 
overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite (Charm. 155d2-8).  
 
See also Shapiro, H.A. “Courtship in Attic Vase Painting” in American Journal of Archaeology Vol. 85, 
No. 2 (Apr., 1981), p. 135. Shapiro suggests that it is at the palaestra where most of the courting took 
place. The regulation for one’s conduct in the palaestra was not limited to decorum. See Crowther, N.B. 
1977. “Weightlifting in antiquity. Achievement and training”. Greece and Rome. 24: 111-120, where he 
discussed the systematic and regimented training athletes underwent. Also See Crowther, N.B. 1985a. 
“Studies in Greek athletics. Part 1”. Classical World. 78: 498-558 and Crowther, N.B. 1985b. “Studies in 
Greek athletics. Part 2”. Classical World. 79: 73-136, for his  discussion on the proper holding techniques 
of the wrestlers. Finally, See Plato’s Laws Bk. VII, 796a2-796b4 for the rules that govern ‘stand-up-
wrestling’.  
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Thus, is the Ancient Greek conception of paideia a complex, multilevel, 
pedagogical system, concerned with both the education of one’s mind and one’s body. As 
a strict pedagogy, archaia paideia is composed of two divisions, mousikē and 
gymnastikē, each of which is composed of their respective constituent parts, viz., 
mousikē, composed of poetry and the remembered glory (kléos) of poetic heroes, meant 
to teach morality —  and gymnastikē, composed of wrestling, (palê), and dance, (choros). 
Mousikē plays a necessary role in the intellectual cultivation of a student’s mind and 
gymnastikē plays a necessary role in the cultivation of a student’s body. Both branches of 
archaia paideia seek to teach virtue, arête; this fact underlies the “system” of education. 
The cultivation of the mind and the body does not presuppose, however, a division 
between the two.  
The first component of gymnastikē, then, the dance, facilitates mimēsis. As poetic 
mimēsis allows the poet to express kléos and arête in his rendition of an epic poem, so, 
too, is the dancer capable of expressing the virtue of an epic hero, which was to be 
emulated by the spectators. In an insightful passage, Lippman writes, 
The imitation takes the form of pantomime, but not as a 
conscious art exercised with detachment; instead it 
becomes an identification of the initiates with the actual 
followers of Dionysus, and through them, with the god 
himself. In this activity we have the archetype of mimēsis 
and of drama (Lippman, 1963, p. 190).  
 
It is important to note that the pantomime is not a conscious exercise; the steps of the 
dance are not choreographed, rather, the dancer, or more accurate the “devotee” is 
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possesses. The trance-like state of the improvisation may be said to channel or identify 
the devotee with Dionysus himself, through an intoxicating melody.22  
It may be misleading to suggest however, that dance, in the context of religious 
worship is imitation. Fitton elaborates,  
When the word [mimēsis] is used of cult-acts, then clearly 
this is not imitation, for the worshipper did not imitate the 
god but impersonated or acted the role of the god (Fitton, 
1973, p. 261). 
 
Initially followers of Dionysus, both men and women, paid homage to their deity ― the 
god of fertility and wine, through discordant and erratic dance, which unsettled many 
Greeks. In his conversation with Clinias the Athenian stranger comments,  
As for the dances of bacchanals and their like, which 
present what is called a ‘mimic’ exhibition of persons in 
liquor, under the designations of…satyrs…The most 
correct course, I think, [is to]…declare it unfit for a citizen 
(Laws Bk. VII, 815c-d).23  
 
 
22 See Aristotle. The Politics. trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1948. p. 350. The 
hysteria of religious music is perfectly identified by Aristotle in the following quote,  
 
These persons, as we can observe for ourselves, are affected by religious  
melodies; and when they come under the influence of melodies which fill the  
soul with religious excitement they are calmed and restored as if they had  
undergone a medical treatment and purging. . (Politics Bk. VIII, VII, § 4).  
 
As Aristotle has written, the music “fills the soul,” i.e., the infinite has commingled with the finite ― man 
must therefore benefit from this interaction, as discussed in the previous footnote. It should be clear that the 
reason for music’s ability to procure health rests in the devotee’s belief of the divine. That is to say, it is the 
belief that the divine is manifest within, channeled through a combination of mousikē and gymnastikē, 
which treats devotees with their ailments. The intoxicating melody sooths the soul and the movements of 
the dancer, accompanied by the narration of the speaker serves to embody the divine, i.e., to manifest the 
divine within. The word (enthousiasmos), for example, en-theos-iasmos literally means ― ‘the state of 
having the god within one’. See also Lawler, Lillian B. The Dance in Ancient Greece. Connecticut : 
Wesleyan University Press. 1964. p. 76, for a further discussion.  
23 Lawler suggests that some of Dionysus’ companions were satyrs or ‘goat men’, since the goat 
was sacred to the gods (Lawler, 1964, p.78). Her explanation puts the Athenian stranger’s comment to 
Clinias in its proper context. The Athenian stranger is referring to actual dancers in mentioning satyrs, as 
the followers of the Dionysiac cult “appeared with horned head-dresses, goat-skin trunks and sometimes 
footgear contrived to resemble cloven hoofs” (Lawler, 1964, p. 78). 
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The role of religious music and dance in archaia paideia is underwritten by the 
gods. 
Most of the Greeks seem to have believed that the dance  
was divinely inspired ― a direct creation of the gods, by  
them revealed to chosen mortals, who then taught it to their  
fellow men (Lawler, 1962, p. 5). 
 
It has also been illustrated in the discussion where Protagoras suggests, “they [the 
children] are sent to trainers, so that a good mind may have a good body to serve it” 
(Prot. 326b6). We began the discussion of archaia paideia with the recognition that it 
was composed of mousikē for the soul and gymnastikē for the body: (Prot. 312b), (Rep. 
376e3), (Laws. 795d6-795e), (Clds. 960-982), and Aristotle’s Politics (Bk. VIII, IV). For 
the Ancient Greek both the soul and the body were essential in the cultivation of arête 
and in the education of Athenian citizens. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Archaic Paideia: Sunousia and the Practice of Paederasty 
Introduction 
 
 One cannot discus paideia in Ancient Greece or Plato’s criticism of it, without 
explaining the Ancient Greek practice of sunousia. Sunousia consists of an emotional and 
erotic relationship between two males; it is often part of the education of an adolescent 
male from the upper-class.   
Paederastic relationships during antiquity can take many forms, which allows for 
different foci of study among modern scholars. Some focus on the laws that regulated 
sexual intercourse between the lover, (erastēs), an older man, and his beloved, 
(erōmenos), a younger boy;24 others, on the representation of homoerotic courtships 
among gentlemen, (kaloi kagathoi);25 and still others on the representation of young 
Athenian males on Attic vase-paintings.26   
A discussion of sexuality in ancient Greece is complicated for a number of 
reasons. To specify our investigation I will use the term ‘sexuality’ in the sense that many 
constructionists do, as the ancient Greeks did not view sexuality as an identity.27 
                                                 
24 Cohen, David J. “Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens”, 117 Past and Present 
(3) 1987. p. 3-21. 
25 For an in depth discussion on the nature of the kaloi kagathoi See Harris, Edward M. 1995. 
Aeschines and Athenian Politics: New York: Oxford University Press, p. 18-23. It is important not to 
anachronistically attribute “hereditary privileges” to members of the kaloi kagathoi, as it was possible for 
one to eventually attain such position independent of heredity.  
26 See Shapiro, H.A. “Courtship in Attic Vase Painting” in American Journal of Archaeology Vol. 
85, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), p. 133-143. 
27 There is a strong essentialist tone in contemporary discussions of homosexuality in Ancient 
Greece, suggesting, at least implicitly, the universalization of sexuality across time. This conception stands 
in opposition to a Foucauldian or constructionist position. The cultural construction of sexuality is evident 
in Foucault’s comment  that “In [Ancient] Greece, truth and sex were linked, in the form of pedagogy, by 
the transmission of precious knowledge from one body to another; sex served as a medium for initiation 
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Sexuality as a cultural construction stands in contrast to sex, the physical activities 
producing pleasure and/or reproduction, although sexual pleasure is culturally 
constructed and not merely physical. For the ancient Greeks, the practice of sunousia—
the relation of an erastēs with his erōmenos—is embedded in a set of cultural practices 
and norms very different from our own. Sunousia functions as an accepted pedagogical 
practice in early Greece, one which requires critical examination if one is to appreciate 
the function of ancient Greek paideia, and Plato’s criticisms of it. 
On contemporary conceptions of sex and sexuality, sunousia could not be an 
acceptable pedagogical practice, for although there may be an erotic component in 
pedagogy, sexual activity has no place in education, especially sex between an older 
teacher and an adolescent student. While the association between sexuality and one’s 
acquisition of knowledge through education is certainly foreign to contemporary readers, 
an attempt to understand ancient Greek pedagogy independent of its association of sex 
and sexuality fails to grasp the true nature of ancient Greek paideia. Moreover, in 
presenting a descriptive analysis, one concerned with explicating the ways that fostered 
an association between sexuality and education, one most recognize that Plato critiques 
the association of sexuality with education insofar as it fails to transcend the physical for 
an intellectual love. Plato, then, is critical of the erotic component of education taking the 
form of sexual activity, but his reasons are different from those of contemporary society. 
 
into learning” (Foucault, 1978, p. 61). The ancients did not articulate homosexuality as an identity, 
suggesting that one should avoid attaching the label ‘homosexual’ to the sexual activities of the ancient 
Greeks. The point, then, is that whether on essentialist or constructionist grounds, the application of the 
terms ‘homosexual’ or ‘homoerotic’ to the practice of paideia, particularly archaia paideia, is a misnomer, 
since the application of such terms presuppose that the Ancients recognized homosexuality as a means of 
identification.   
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In ancient Greece, a good education is a prerequisite for all aspiring members, 
which meant that each prospect was sufficiently trained in mousikē, gymnastikē, and 
poetry (Harris, 1995, p. 20). Beyond such traditional education or perhaps as its final 
stage is the “association” of an older man with a younger boy, which is know as 
sunousia. This is distinct from the eroticism inextricably linked with paederastic courting, 
although much of the literature fails to demarcate one from the other. One’s aspiration to 
become a kalos kagathos required education. While it is true that sexual “favors” may be 
exchanged between an erastēs and his erōmenos, the education of the youth was 
paramount. Strict laws and social practice regulated sexual activity and education.28 The 
kaloi kagathoi — the beautiful and good, and also wealthy — wanted to ensure their sons 
received the best education, since a good education was essential in becoming a 
gentleman. Protagoras reinforces this conception in his discussion with Socrates. 
All this [education] is done by those best able to do it —  
that is, by the wealthy — and it is their sons who start their  
 
education at the earliest age and continue in the longest  
(Prot. 326b6-c3). 
 
 I will argue, then, that while sunousia contains erotic components, when used in a 
discussion of archaia paideia, sunousia refers — primarily — to the “enculturation”29 of 
Athenian youth through their paideutic association with an older, wiser, and more 
virtuous man, whereas the practice of paederasty refers — primarily — to Hellenic 
homoeroticism. This is an important conceptual difference. An investigation of the social 
 
28 See Cohen, David J. “Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens”, 117 Past and 
Present (3) 1987, p. 6 or Plato’s Laws Bk. VIII.  
29 Kevin Robb discusses sunousia as a process of enculturation in “Asebeia and Sunousia: The 
Issues Behind the Indictment of Socrates” in Plato's Dialogues, New Studies and Interpretations. ed. 
Gerald Press. 1993 
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acceptance of sexual practices during antiquity rests outside the scope of our analysis of 
Ancient Greek paideia and will not be discussed, although the Platonic dialogues contain 
references to homoeroticism and its legislation in Hellenic society.30  
Our investigation focuses, first, on legal provisions in the regulation of 
homoerotic behavior, as associated with archaia paideia. Second we will concentrate on 
the relation between sunousia and the educational practices of the Ancient Greeks from 
the 6th to the 4th centuries B.C..  
David Cohen writes, 
The legal provisions regulating various forms of  
homoerotic behavior may be grouped in three categories:  
laws relating to prostitution; laws relating to education and  
courtship; and, finally, general provisions concerning  
sexual assault (Cohen, 1987, p. 5). 
 
The second legislative provision, which regulated “education and courtship”, is central to 
our investigation. Plato’s dialogues serve as the best source for such an analysis; as 
 
30 See Plato’s Laws Bk. VIII, 836c. In his discussion with Clinias, the Athenian stranger illustrates 
the difficulty surrounding legislation attempting to regulate sexual practices among members of its 
citizenry, as such legislation would take as its justification the fact that in nature the male of a species does 
not concern himself carnally with another male of the same species. The Athenian stranger illustrates to do 
so would be considered “unnatural”. The Athenian stranger claims, “Were one to follow the guidance of 
nature and adopt the law of the old days…[pronouncing] it wrong for male[s]…to do carnally with youthful 
male[s]…[fetching] his evidence from…animals, pointing out that male does not touch male in this 
way…in would be at variance with the practice of your society” (Laws Bk. VIII, 836c-c5). The same, 
however, is not true for man — as man is capable of sexual congress with another man. With respect to this 
fact, the term “unnatural” cannot apply to homoeroticism, since we, as human beings, are part of the natural 
world. Legislation for the Ancient Greeks focused on the courtship of an eromenos with his older erastes 
and regulation of the sexual act. For Ancient Greek men, ejaculation was typically reached intercrurally, 
i.e., through the insertion of the penis between the thighs of an eromenos. Dover writes, “The thighs [of a 
young boy] seem to have been a powerful stimulus” (Dover, 1978, p. 70). Anal sex, (euryproktos), was also 
a source of sexual gratification, but not as common. See Shapiro’s discussion in “Courtship in Attic Vase 
Painting” in American Journal of Archaeology Vol. 85, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), p. 85. See Cohen, David J. 
“Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens”, 117 Past and Present (3) 1987. p. 3-21. For 
example, Cohen discussed the laws that prohibited an older slave from acting as an erastes to a free boy, 
which is fully explicated in Aeschines’ Against Timarchus (138-40). In Plato’s Lysis. The mere fact that a 
slave had governorship over Lysis was itself reproachable, See (208b9-208c8). Moreover, Plato’s 
characters often discusses the legislative censure necessary to restrain an over zealous erastes from 
dominating an “effeminate” eromenos, (Laws Bk. VIII, 836e1-e4), (Sym. 184c-c8). Much, then, is need to 
adequately regulate the sexual conduct of the Athenian citizenry.    
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Shapiro writes, “…the fullest and most reliable written documentation of the erastēs-
erōmenos relationship is in the dialogues of Plato…” (Shapiro, 1981, p. 143). I will also 
incorporate Aeschines’ investigation of male sexual activity and law, as Fisher notes, 
“Aeschines’ speech is in fact our best source for Athenian laws regulating sexual 
behavior between males…in classical Athens” (Aeschines, 2001, p. 25). Plato’s 
discussion of the process of courting and Aeschines’ analysis of the regulation on 
homoeroticism will contribute to a fuller understanding of homoerotic-education in 
antiquity.  
 It is interesting to note the language used by Pausanias in the Symposium when 
discussing the laws and the sexual metaphors that underlie legislative regulations. 
Pausanias comments, “Thus, wherever the laws enacts that it is wrong to yield to the 
lover, you may be sure that the fault lies with the legislators — that is to say, it is due to 
the oppression of the rulers and the servility of their subjects” (my emphasis), (Sym. 
182c8-3). Later he uses the same terminology to discuss the nature of the relationship 
between the erastēs and the erōmenos, saying, “…for his friends would accuse him of the 
most abject servility…” (my emphasis), (Sym. 183a6). Rulers assume the role of the 
“vicious lover,” and the citizens of the polis assumes the role of the submissive partner. 
This relationship of dominance, with rulers over members of a submissive citizenry could 
not have facilitated proper legislation; thus Pausanias’ conclusion that, “…you may be 
sure that the fault lies with the legislators.” But the blame also lies in the servility of the 
people, for the relationship between the city and the polis should emulate the “virtuous 
lover,” as Pausanias has described.   
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In Pausanias’ proposal to form new legislation regulating sexual congress 
between an erastēs and an erōmenos, he also defends an idealized conception of the city, 
devoid of “servility” and oppression”,  
We must therefore combine these two laws—the one that  
deals with the love of boys and the one that deals with the  
pursuit of wisdom and the other virtues—before we can  
agree that the youth is justified in yielding to his lover. For  
it is only when lover and beloved come together, each  
governed by his own especial law—the former lawfully  
enslaving himself to the youth he loves, in return for his  
compliance, the latter lawfully devoting his services to the  
friend who is helping him to become wise and good—the  
one sharing his wealth of wisdom and virtue, and the other  
drawing, in his poverty, upon his friend for a liberal  
education—it is then, I say, and only then, when the  
observance of the two laws coincides, that it is right for the  
lover to have his way (183d-e).   
 
The section of his speech from 184c until the end is more appropriately seen as a 
discussion of the practices of sunousia, for the fundamental purpose of the latter is the 
“enculturation” of the youth, instilling virtue, and education, and sexual gratification is of 
secondary importance. Contrast Pausanias’ speech, then, with the speech of Philosophy 
proper in Aristophanes’ Clouds. Aristophanes writes, 
let me begin by explaining how education was run in the 
good old days when my just cause was predominant and 
discretion was the aspiration of every man. First it was 
given that boys should be seen and not heard…These boys 
were taught fine, patriotic songs…and if any boy engaged 
in classroom buffoonery or attempted to torture music by 
singing in the cacophonic, newfangled style…he was given 
a damned good thrashing for deliberately perverting the 
Muses! Also while sitting in the gymnasium the boys had 
to keep their legs closed in order that they not expose the 
spectator to any inappropriate and offensive sights…They 
were not permitted to entice older lovers with effeminate 
voices, or seductive looks, nor mince around pimping 
themselves out to all and sundry! (Clds. 961-980). 
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Aristophanes criticizes homoeroticism. Pausanias, however, attempts to defend sunousia 
although he sometimes conflates it with the practices of paederastic courtship. 
To understand paideia, it is necessary to demarcate those conceptions formerly 
conflated. Archaia paideia refers — primarily — to “enculturation”, to use Robb’s 
terminology, whereas paederasty refers — primarily — to Hellenic homoeroticism. 
Sunousia and paederasty are not the same practice, despite their superficial similarities. 
This can be seen in the laws affecting conduct in the palaestra. 
 The palaestra was an optimal setting for courting young Athenian boys, but it was 
also a place of education. What, then, were the laws, which regulated one’s conduct in 
the palaestra, ensuring that sexual desire did not conflict with the boys education? 
Aeschines writes,  
consider the case of the teachers. Although the very  
livelihood of these men, to whom we necessarily entrust  
our own children, depends on their good character, while 
the opposite conduct on their part would mean poverty, yet 
it is plain that the lawgivers distrust them; for he expressly 
prescribes, first, at what time of the day the free-born boy is 
to go to the school-room;…and when he is to go home. He 
forbids the teacher to open the school-room, or the 
gymnastics trainer the wrestling school, before sunrise, and 
he commands them to close the doors before sunset; for he 
is exceeding[ly] suspicious of their being alone with the 
boy, or in the dark with him (Tim, 9-10).  
 
The Ancient Greeks had no qualms, then, about mandating laws to secure the well being 
of their young men. During daylight, the palaestra was a suitable setting for education. 
The hours prior to dawn and after dusk, however, where unsuitable times for education.  
 The legislative regulations discussed by Aeschines are important in our 
investigation for two reasons. First, these regulations illustrate the obvious concern the 
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Athenian dēmos had for protecting their young — especially their boys. Second, these 
legislative regulations ensured that the facilities were in fact used for the education, 
which suggests the importance the dēmos placed on education. Insofar as the codified 
laws stipulated appropriate hours, wherein boys could receive instructions and hour 
prohibiting such instruction, the law reinforces the importance placed on “instructional 
time”, thereby holding instructors accountable for what was taught and how the time was 
spent during the hours between sunrise and sunset. The laws (nomoi) stipulated, “If any 
one enter in violation of this prohibition, he shall be punished with death” (Tim. 12). And 
the regulation included the trainers or (pedotribe) also, “A gymnasiarch who does permit 
this [illegal access to the boys] and fails to keep such a person out of the gymnasium, 
shall be liable to the penalties prescribed for the seduction of a free-born youth”. (Tim. 
13). There is no confusion about what inappropriate conduct consisted, as the law clearly 
mandated that a violation of the law would result in death.  
 The clarity of the laws concerning the sexual conduct in the gymnasium and 
schoolroom, primary settings for education, should be contrasted against the lacuna of 
legislative regulations concerning the practice of paederasty. Granted this gap is due in 
part to limited archeological findings concerning this highly specified topic. But there 
may be a philosophical explanation for this apparent gap. On the one hand, in his speech 
against Timarchus, Aeschines directly cites the laws (nomoi), which precisely defines the 
regulations and the punishment for violating such regulations, viz., death. Again, these 
regulations pertain specifically to educational settings. Now, contrast this fact with 
Pausanias’ suggestion in Plato’s Symposium, wherein he says, “…gentlemen [kaloi 
kagathoi], may I point out that, while in all the other states of the Hellas the laws that 
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deal with Love are so simple and well defined that they are easy enough to master, our 
own code is most involved” (Sym. 182a7-182b). What account can be made for the 
“apparent” legislative disparity between the laws regulating appropriate sexual behavior, 
which are clearly defined with respect to educational facilities, but which are “most 
involved”, to use Pausanias’ words, with respect to Greek life?31  
It is my suggestion that legislators themselves recognized a distinction between 
the practice of paederasty, on the one hand, and the “association” (sunousia) of an erastēs 
with an erōmenos, on the other, the justification of which would further particularize our 
discussion of Greek paideia. This recognition of difference offers an appropriate 
explanation for the “apparent” legislative lacuna.  
Athenian laws sought to protect their boys and their educational institutions from 
corruption and debauchery and in the same sense recognized the importance of the 
private lives of its citizenry, which accounts for the confusion Pausanias has with 
interpreting the law. In the funeral oration of Pericles, we hear that: 
The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends 
also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a 
jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called 
upon to be angry with our neighbors for doing what he 
likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which 
cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive 
penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not 
make us lawless as citizens (Thuc. 2. 37-38).  
 
The distinction between sunousia and the practice of paederasty is supported by this 
apparent legislative lacuna. The laws concerning the lives of adults must have been 
harder to codify, while simultaneously acknowledging the privacy of the citizenry, which 
 
31 For the sake of clarity, we should remind ourselves what else Pausanias says in the Symposium. 
In suggesting that there is a lacuna in the legislative regulations, I am not referring to “missing laws”. I am, 
as is Pausanias, referring to the apparent contradictions one arrives to if one follows the law.  
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would account for Pausanias’ confusion in interpreting the law. Regulations needed to be 
codified, but that is, to use an old adage, “easier said than done”. Pericles, himself, asserts 
that the intention of the law is not to “exercise a jealous surveillance” over its citizenry, 
and regulating the practices of paederasty can be a complicated business. However, the 
law is explicit in its prohibition and punishment for infractions pertaining to the 
regulation of educational facilities and of its educators. Hence, these laws, while still 
generally concerned with regulating sexual behavior, were directly concerned with, as I 
have said, (1) safeguarding the students, and (2) safeguarding the educational institution. 
This suggests — as it is impossible to “prove”, a legal distinction between the practice of 
paederasty, on the one hand, and sunousia, on the other, legislation for the latter was 
unconcerned with recognizing the privacy of the youth, as they are not yet of age. 
Without this paternalism in Greek law, corruption and debauchery would surely follow. 
Note, however, as is still true in our contemporary society, the difficulty in regulating or 
“enforcing” fundamentally private matters concerning sexual congress.32  
Sunousia and Archaia Paideia 
 What, then, is sunousia, if it is not the same as the practice of paederasty? What is 
the relationship between sunousia, on the one hand and archaia paideia, on the other? 
                                                 
32 See State v. Laforrest, 71 Vt. 311, 312 (1899), People v. Doggett, 188 P.2d, 792 (Cal. App. 
1948). For anti-sodomy laws, specifically between members of the same sex, See. Arkansas M 5-14-111, 
Kansas M 21-3505 and Missouri M566.090. See also, “Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Laws” in the 
Washington Post. Oct. 26, 1990, Appendix Tab 13. To quote the Washington Post directly, “Powell, who 
retired in 1987, provided the fifth vote to uphold the law and reject arguments that the constitutional right 
to privacy covers homosexual conduct”. (my italics). As this is a discussion of the Ancient Greeks and not 
contemporary legislative regulations, a detailed analysis of this case is out of place. But Pericles noted, the 
privacy of the citizenry is important to rulers and legislators alike, which as we have seen, citing Pausanias, 
leads to confusion in interpreting the law. However, no such confusion arises with respect to the laws 
regulating sexual behavior concerning the education of Athenian youth or the educational system as such, 
because legislators do not have to acknowledge the privacy of children. Rather, these laws tend to be 
paternalistic in their construction, which leads to the conclusion that legislators recognized a distinction 
between sexual behavior concerning the educational system and sexual behavior outside of the educational 
purview.  
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Our analysis of sunousia must first acknowledge, as Kevin Robb has already illustrated, 
that it is inextricably tied to the oral and fundamentally preliterate traditions of classical 
Greece. As he writes, “Sunousia was an important, cherished feature of oral Greece…[it] 
was, in the preliterate ages of our species, a fundamental and daily exercise, necessary to 
survival” (Robb, 1994, p. 197-198). The epic poems of Homer played an important role 
in the education of Athenian youth, instilling such conceptions as morality, piety and 
justice. Prior to the rise of literacy throughout the Hellenes, entire passages and systems 
of formulae enabling extemporaneous composition had to be committed to memory. 
Robb writes, “Greek Mimēsis…had its origins…in the ancient demands of oral memory 
and the manner in which a complex paideia had been communicated to a people” (Robb, 
1994, p. 220). The hero’s kléos acts as a normative “ought”, for how else could ethics and 
morality be taught in a preliterate society? Carrying out the lessons of epic poetry in a 
society dominated by oral instruction encouraged the “association” between “the younger 
generation and the older”. This association fortified the obligation to social order, while 
simultaneously educating the youth of arête. The education of virtue dominated the 
preliterate educational system and even when the youth of Athens were educated in the 
sense of learning their letters, those institutions that developed in Greece’s preliterate 
ages persisted. The sunousia that evolved out of necessity persisted as members of the 
older generation educated the youth in return for, among other things, sexual favors.   
For the Ancient Greeks, then, pedagogy and sex were inextricably bound. 
Therefore, since the laws regulating sexual activity within the educational setting were 
clearer and more consistent than those regarding the prohibitions of sexual behavior 
outside the educational setting, one is justified in drawing a distinction between sunousia, 
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primarily concerned with education, on the one hand, and the practice of paederasty, a 
social convention, on the other. For Plato, however, arête is not to be conceived in the 
traditional sense, i.e., as attained through kléos and poetic mimēsis, nor should the erotic 
competent of paideia take the form of sexual activity between the erastēs and erōmenos. 
The model of active and passive partners in the pursuit of virtue is refuted by Plato, 
which is exemplified in the failure of Alcibiades and his deficiencies as a student of 
Socrates. Thus, Plato is able to defend an active/active model—explicated in the speech 
of Diotima, which stands in contrast to the failures of Alcibiades and the practice of 
archaia paideia that educated him. The specific “association” between an erastēs and 
erōmenos, then, serves only to catalyze a further pursuit of Eros, paideia and arête, which 
leads one up the “ladder of love” for an appreciation of universal Beauty, rather than the 
particular beauty of an erōmenos. This distinction between Philosophy and traditional 
educational systems, unfolds in the final two speeches of Plato’s Symposium, as we learn 
of Diotima’s new way of speaking—philosophy.  
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Chapter Three  
 
Eros and Athenian Education 
Introduction 
 We have analyzed the many facets of archaia paideia, attempting to refine our 
conception of Greek paideia in general. Our discussion of paideia must also include an 
investigation of rhetoric and oration, which was central to the political discourse of the 
city and therefore served as an important vehicle for paideia.33 Oration and rhetoric are 
not to be contrasted with archaia paideia, but should be considered as an extension of the 
traditional educational model. As we will see throughout this chapter, the topoi employed 
in rhetoric and oration, to convey complex metaphors, has its basis in the practices of 
archaia paideia, in particular the “association” between the erastēs and his beloved 
erōmenos. 
Pericles’ Metaphor of the Erastēs 
The funeral oration of Pericles for the first of the fallen soldiers, after the outbreak 
of the Peloponnesian War, inspires one’s love for Athens and one’s sense of honor in 
being an Athenian. This is accomplished by Pericles’ metaphor of the erastēs,34 for 
Athenian citizens should love Athens as the erastēs loves his beloved erōmenos. Hence, 
the lover (erastēs) should pursue Athens as the beloved (erōmenos). It is customary that 
                                                 
33 One learns virtue by participating in the life of the polis, as Socrates notoriously informs the 
members of the jury during his trial, (38a-4) and then again in the Meno where he states that “a man’s 
virtue lay in directing the city well” ( 73a4-5). Thus, the concept of virtue is intimately tied to one’s 
participation with the polis. 
34 Thucydides writes, “τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ 
ἐραστὰς γιγνομένουσ αὐτῆς” (my emphasis), (Thuc. 2.43.1) translated as: “you should gaze, day after 
day, upon the greatness of Athens and become her lovers” translation from Simon Hornblower, A 
commentary on Thucydides: Vol. 1. New York, Clarendon Press. © 1991, p. 311.  
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such a panegyric be delivered in honor of the fallen soldiers.35 Pericles, in his opening 
statements recognizes the practice of custom and law, which mandates that such an 
occasion occur, saying, “…this speech [is] part of the law…it becomes my duty to obey 
the law…”(2.35). But Pericles uses this opportunity not only to honor the soldiers but the 
people of Athens as well, including the metics, or resident aliens, and the women of 
Athens. The account of his speech is found in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. Pericles 
proclaims: “We open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners 
from any opportunity of learning or observing” (2.39).36 Pericles was careful to address 
not only the citizens of Athens who were free Athenian men, but the population of 
Athens as such. The genius of his oration rests in the fact that he personifies the city and 
accentuates its beauty and the soldiers’ undying love for her. The soldiers—and 
citizens—as erastēs, are encouraged — actively —to pursue their love for Athens as the 
lover pursues his beloved (erōmenos). In an earlier part of the speech Pericles says, “Such 
is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly 
fought and died” (2.41). He then calls upon citizens, metics and women to renew their 
love for Athens as well, “…you should gaze, day after day, upon the greatness of Athens 
and become her lovers” (2.43.1), the significance of which will become clear. 
The inclusiveness of his oration and the vivid depictions of 
one’s love for Athens culminate in the following quote, 
“For it is only the love of honor (philotimia) that never 
 
35 See. Thucydides. 1951. The Complete Writings of Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War. The 
unabridged Crawley translation with an intro. by John H. Finley. New York: The Modern Library, p. 102-
103. The beauty of Pericles’ speech is not that it had to be given, as a stipulation of his office and the laws 
that governed, but that he gave it so well and with such sincerity. His sincerity and ability to excite the 
dēmos with words of inspiration are timeless hallmarks of good oration.  
36 He continues, “…if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence to those of you who 
will now be in widowhood, it will be all compromised in this brief exhortation” (2.45). 
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grows old; and honor it is, not gain…that rejoices the heart 
of age and helplessness” (2.44).37  
 
For Pericles, the drive for immortality is reflected in this conception of love, obviously 
modeled after the practice of sunousia and philotimia, as it was this educational model he 
used in rearing his sons (Paralus and Xanthippus) before they received a more formal 
education in rhetoric and sophistry.38  
The hero’s kléos translates into the normative “ought”, i.e., the means by which 
ethics and morality are taught in a preliterate society. Plato, a 4th century author, situates 
his characters in or about the 5th century, in which moral education was still essentially 
tied to narrative (speech), be it poetic mimēsis or the rhetoric of Funeral Orations: the 
same principles where used to educate the Athenian polis in matter of arête and proper 
conduct. It is an educational model which was presupposed by Pericles, and rightfully so, 
as no elaboration was needed to explain how to love Athens. It was presupposed because 
Pericles could have assumed that most, if not all of the citizenry, were educated under the 
pedagogical methods of archaia paideia, which would allow for the metaphor to take 
root. This is implicit in his remarks. The audience would already know the structure of 
the (erastēs/ erōmenos) relationship, and recognize its direct connection with education. 
They would immediately recognize when Pericles says, “they each of them individually 
received that renown (kléos) which never grows old” (2.43) that such a conception was 
 
37 With respect to philotimia, Charles Guignon elucidates,  
for people in premodern societies the central concern was with honor, 
that is, with doing well in the performance of one’s socially prescribed 
roles. It follows that, in such societies, the primary orientation of life 
was “outward” rather than inward: what mattered was how one was 
faring in the shared undertakings of communal life (my emphasis), 
(Guignon, 2004, 149) 
38 See Protagoras (314e-315b) and Meno (94b). 
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connected with their formative years in archaia paideia, where they were taught morality 
through a similar pedagogical method, albeit based in poetic verse. Thus, it is a latent 
understanding of the traditional Athenian educational model, which allows Pericles’ 
metaphor to work. In that he relates the polis with the erastēs signifies his respect for the 
audience, they are the older, wiser and active participant according to the metaphor. They 
are teachers and educators (of successive generations) and his speech is merely a 
reminder of this fact. Pericles says,  
Yet you who are still at an age to beget children must bear 
up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will 
they help you forget those whom you have lost, but will be 
to the state at once a reinforcement and a security…those of 
you who have passed your prime must congratulate 
yourselves with the thought that the best part of your life 
was fortunate (2.44). 
 
Pericles encourages the citizens to pursue Athens, as an erastēs. The shared life of 
the polis suggests that all citizens, in their love of Athens, contributed to the perpetuation 
of Athens. One’s love for Athens reflects one’s love of honor — as honorable men and 
women must yield an honorable city. Hence one’s love for Athens serves as the means by 
which Athens is itself an honorable city. Pericles suggests that philotimia “never grows 
old” and motivates his audience, in times of helplessness and despair, to recognize that 
the love of honor will ease the pangs of life. 
 Any citizen, metic or woman present that day must have been filled with a sense 
of pride and honor, as the general of the Athenian military honors both the fallen soldiers 
and the population of Athens. Such speeches, throughout the course of history, elicit a 
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call to action within the population. Such speeches serve to identify its population as 
distinct and of significance.39
The tragic poet Aeschylus had inscribed on his epitaph the following: 
Under this monument lies Aeschylus the Athenian, 
Euphorion’s son, who died in the wheatlands of Gela. The 
grove of Marathon with its glories can speak of his valor in 
battle. The long-haired Persian remembers, and can speak 
of it too (Kahn, 1962).  
 
Insofar as Aeschylus was an esteemed poet and chose, rather, to be remembered as an 
Athenian who died for his love of Athens, his epitaph prefigures the funeral oration of 
Pericles some twenty years later. Aeschylus’ identity as an Athenian and soldier was of 
enough importance to him that he chose to be remembered as such, rather than how we 
have come to remember him.  In one of his most famous lines Pericles says, “heroes have 
the whole earth for their tomb” (2.43), which explains why “those slain at Marathon, who 
for their singular and extraordinary valor were interred on the spot where they fell” 
(2.34). This sense of one’s love for Athens in fact, identified a people. 
 Such love of Athens and esteem for those who fought at Marathon was not 
relegated to politicians. In a rare moment of earnestness, Aristophanes writes, “It is my 
system of student tutoring that raised the men who fought so bravely at Marathon” (Clds. 
986). Undeniably, then, Eros factored heavily into political life, and it too served as a 
vehicle for educating Athenian citizens.  
Joanne Waugh writes, “It was in public discourse such as the Funeral Oration that 
the love of Athens was made visible, the very act of speaking these words and listening to 
 
39 An analogy in recent memory is John F. Kennedy’s exhortation in his inaugural speech as 
President: “…ask not what your country can do for you: ask what you can do for your country”.  
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them, generated, like physical desire, heat and excitement” (my emphasis), (Waugh, 
1997, p. 215). Throughout the Platonic Dialogues there are countless examples where 
speech either excites or represses sexual — physical — desire.40 Sara Monoson 
comments on Pericles’ allusion to sunousia in rallying the citizens of Athens, 
Pericles’ metaphor reinforces the conventional notion of 
eroticism and love relations because it relies precisely on 
normal negotiations of active and passive roles in a 
pederastic love relationship to illuminate the demands of 
democratic citizenship (my emphasis), (Monoson, 1998, p. 
497). 
 
To understand the significance of Monoson’s claim, two words need clarification, viz., 
‘active’ and ‘passive’. In using the term ‘active’ Monoson is referring to the role the 
erastēs plays in traditional Greek education (archaia paideia); and in using the term 
 
40 Waugh’s reference to “heat” and its correlation with speech is essential to our discussion of Eros 
as an effective pedagogical device. The relation between speech and sexual desire plays heavily in our 
analysis of Pericles’ Funeral Oration. Both are equally important in Ancient Greek culture, and both can be 
used to lure one away from, or closer to, a virtuous life. In the Charmides, for example, when confronted 
with the raw sexuality of Charmides, Socrates says, “I caught a sight of his inward garment, and took the 
flame…[later]…I began by degrees to regain confidence, and my natural heat returned” (my emphasis), 
(Char, 155d2 and 156d). In the Symposium Alcibiades comments, “the way [Socrates] got through that 
winter was most impressive…[he] made less fuss about walking on the ice in his bare feet than we did in 
our shoes” (Symp. 220b2). See, Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western 
Civilization (New York:W.W.Norton, 1994). Sennett writes, “Body heat was the key to human physiology: 
those who most concentrated and marshaled their bodily heat had no need for clothes” (Senntt, 1994, p. 
33).  See also, the Timaeus were Socrates says,  
 
we have not yet considered the origin of flesh, or what belongs to flesh, 
or of that part of the soul which is mortal…First, let us inquire what we 
mean by saying that fire is hot, and that about this we may reason from 
the dividing or cutting power which it exercises on our bodies…and 
cuts our bodies into small pieces (κερματίζει), and thus naturally 
produces that affection which we call heat (θερμός, κέρμα), (my 
emphasis), (Tim. 61d-62a5). 
 
Thus, in support of Waugh’s claim that, “It was in public discourse…that the love of Athens was made 
visible” (my emphasis), we note Socrates’ statement: “…nothing is visible where there is no fire” (my 
emphasis), (Tim. 31b4). Her observation that “the very act of speaking these words and listening to them, 
generated, like physical desire, heat and excitement”, rests on the fact  that there was a very real connection 
between speech and its primordial bond with our flesh, i.e., fire/heat. One should lend ear to the 
interpretation that, very literally, the citizenry’s love of Athens is both necessary and sufficient, i.e., 
Pericles’ personification of the city. The existence of Athens as a city is itself contingent on the citizenry’s 
lover for her.   
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‘passive’ she is referring to the erōmenos. It is the erastēs (lover) who pursues the 
erōmenos, (beloved). The erastēs, in courting a younger erōmenos, gives to the erōmenos 
and receives gratification (charizomai), entering into a sexual companionship with the 
young boy. This is the nature of the exchange, paideia for Eros. Hence, as discussed in 
chapter two of this analysis, the sex act itself was always secondary to the “association” 
(sunousia) between the boy and his erastēs. In discussing the active and passive roles of 
archaia paideia it is clear that the erastēs and the erōmenos are considered the active and 
passive participants respectively. Thus, if Pericles relies on this metaphor and suggests 
that “…you should gaze, day after day, upon the greatness of Athens and become her 
lovers” (2.43.1), and the lover is synonymous with the erastēs — and the erastēs is the 
active participant in the “association” between the two parties, then so too should we, the 
citizenry of Athens, actively pursue our love of Athens. But how is this love pursued?   
 For Athenians, public discourse served as an indispensable component of the 
democratic polis—embodied in both flesh and stone.41 To reinforce the point, 
Thucydides makes this point forcefully, 
Our public men…are fair judges of public matters…we 
Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot 
originate, and instead of looking on discussion as a 
stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an 
indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all (my 
emphasis), (2.40). 
The clearest example — integral to this discussion — of the affect of Eros as 
Athenian education, on an individual’s decision making process is in Socrates’ discussion 
with Crito just before his execution. Socrates finds himself jailed and awaiting his 
execution the following day (43d4). While jailed, Socrates’ childhood friend Crito gains 
 
41 See, (Waugh, 1997, p. 213), (Sennett, 1994, p. 33-34), (Zanker, 1995, p. p. 10).   
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permission from the guard to sit and talk with him (43b). The discussion between Crito 
and Socrates begins with Crito pleading for Socrates to escape from prison (44b4). 
Socrates will not base his decision on emotion and will only make such a decision based 
on the application of reason — even if it means losing his life. 
 Through his discussion with Crito, Socrates explains that he cannot escape from 
prison for two reasons. First, he cannot escape on the grounds that during the trail he had 
the opportunity to choose banishment as his punishment (52c). Secondly, Socrates states 
that he cannot escape because it would be wrong to do so, offering a number of examples 
(50a-54d). Socrates arrives at this point by showing that the city provides for its citizens 
and in the provision for its citizens there is an implicit agreement between the citizens 
and the city. This implicit agreement is an acceptance of the laws and policies of the city 
(50b). Therefore, despite Socrates being harmed by the city, he concludes that returning 
harm with harm (escaping from jail) is unjust.  
 It is Socrates’ education, his understanding of Eros and his love for Athens, the 
fact that he has lived for seventy-one years in Athens, and has reared children in Athens 
(52c), which necessitates his conformity with the law. Such, is the affect of Eros as 
Athenian education. Pericles writes, “…as a city we are the school of Hellas” (2.41.1). 
For Pericles, the educational motif is an effective political device because it is easily 
accessible to the general population, i.e., it is a familiar model. It elicits a call to action 
through a direct association of kléos, a pedagogical tool of archaia paideia, used to teach 
morality. The educational motif also reinforces the relevance of discussion/speech as 
integral to the political arena. Participation as an Athenian — in the Assembly or 
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palaestra, agora or within the household — required discussion/speech, and as such, 
people directly contributed to the legislative regulation of Athenian politics.  
While Pericles’ metaphor offers an account of a citizen’s relationship with 
Athens, using the already established (erastēs/ erōmenos) “association” — one between a 
lover and his beloved — his metaphor suffers from some inherent problems, which 
jeopardize both sunousia and archaia paideia. In the discussion of archaia paideia, for 
example, it was noted that the “association” between the erastēs and the erōmenos was an 
active/passive relationship, as illustrated in Monoson’s claim that, “Pericles’ 
metaphor…relies precisely on normal negotiations of active and passive roles in a…love 
relationship” (Monoson, 1998, p. 497).  
The nature of their relationship was one of mutual exchange, as the erōmenos 
would receive an education in mousikē, gymnastikē, and most importantly arête, and the 
erastēs would receive companionship, sexual favors and general gratification 
(charizomai). As Monoson writes, “Pericles erastēs metaphor proposed that individuals 
understand the demands of Athenian citizenship to involve reciprocal relations of mutual 
exchange between themselves and the city” (Monoson, 1998, p. 495). The metaphor 
works insofar as the nature of the exchange between the erastēs and erōmenos reflects an 
idealized conception of the lover/citizen dichotomy, i.e., since Eros is inextricably bound 
to the Athenian conception of citizenry, one can only be a citizen if one actively 
expresses love for Athens. Again, the expression of love takes the form of speech and 
participation in Athenian politics since public discourse serves as an indispensable 
component of the democratic polis, for the Assembly was the means of arriving at 
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decisions in government.42 Hence, the citizens’ love for Athens is pursued to the same 
degree as the erastēs pursues his erōmenos. This however, becomes problematic. 
The problem with Pericles’ metaphor rests in the passivity of the erōmenos in his 
(active/passive) model. His metaphor presupposes the traditional conception of Athenian 
paideia as inextricably tied to Eros — as the vehicle of education — which is exactly 
what Plato’s Socrates is attempting to supplant. In the Symposium, for example, 
Pausanias remarks,  
Now it is the object of Athenian law to make a firm 
distinction between the lover who should be encouraged 
and the lover who should be shunned. And so it enjoins 
pursuit in certain cases, and flight in others, and applies 
various touchstones and criteria to discriminate between the 
two classes of lover and beloved.  
 
Unlike Pericles, Socrates is suggesting that love should represent an active/active, rather 
than active/passive model. He notes, in a conversation with Menexenus and Lysis in the 
Lysis,  
in general…if one man…is desirous and enamored of 
another, he can never have conceived his desire, or 
love…without in some way belonging to the object of his 
love…It cannot possibly be then, but that a true and 
genuine lover is loved in return by the object of his love 
(my emphasis), (221e11-222a8).  
 
Pericles’ metaphor fails because one “can never have conceived” of loving Athens, since 
as the metaphor holds the citizen is to the erastēs as Athens is to the erōmenos, the 
erōmenos is passive and also fleeting.43 According to Socrates, then, one cannot hold 
 
42 See, (Waugh, 1997, p. 213) and (Starr, 1990, p. 29) 
43 Note, it was frowned upon for a man to be a dedicated “homosexual” as he was expected to 
marry and have children. For example, Carnes writes,  
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claim to a feeling of love if the object of one’s love does not love one in return. But 
Jeffery Carnes perfectly summarizes the central point we shall pursue: 
the seeker of truth is consistently described in erotic terms 
as an erastēs of knowledge. The erōmenos disappears: the 
human who would be the object of desire turns out to be 
only the stimulus toward contemplation of absolute Beauty, 
and should himself be involved in actively pursuing Beauty 
and Knowledge, the forms of which, fixed and remote, 
become the only true passive objects in the equation of 
desire (Carnes, 1998, p. 110).  
 
A fuller explanation of this notion will be explored in the final two chapters of 
this investigation. Pericles’ Funeral Oration, however, was not a failure. He, as his 
contemporaries did, used pedagogical topoi in relation to his metaphor of the erastēs to 
communicate, effectively, a complex notion, namely, a citizen’s love for Athens through 
an educational paradigm. We have seen that such indoctrination served to guide even 
Socrates in his decision not to flee his execution, which testifies to the efficiency of 
political oration/legislation. Nevertheless, unlike Pericles, Socrates recognizes that to 
communicate a conception of Eros as Athenian education, one must first recognize that to 
love is to be loved, and that the ultimate end of one’s love cannot be vested in an 
individual, as individuals grow old and die, or betray our love, but must be vested in the 
conception of Beauty as eternal. A new educational paradigm must recognize, as Carnes 
writes, one’s involvement “in actively pursuing Beauty and Knowledge”, which 
inevitably leads to free and open inquiry, since such inquiry is unobstructed by 
 
Given the abundance of evidence that attraction to both youths and 
women was considered the norm for Greek men, and given Plato’s 
relentless attention to transgression throughout Aristophanes’ speech, 
there is no reason to think that the reluctant bridegrooms of 192a-b 
[referring to Pausanias’ and Agathon’s relationship] are anything other 
than transgressive (Carnes. 1998, p. 112). 
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convention. The groundwork, then, for free and open inquiry and the introduction of 
sophistry as a viable educational model, becomes contingent on dismantling the 
(active/passive) model of the (erastēs/erōmenos) dichotomy inherent in the pedagogical 
methods of archaia paideia.   
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Chapter Four 
 
The Transition from Archaia Paideia to New Education 
 
 The previous three chapters were devoted to the role of paideia, in particular 
archaia paideia, in fifth century Athens; in this chapter the emphasis shifts to its 
dissolution. It is hard to see how archaia paideia could have bee supplanted without the 
rise of the sophists. 
There are many differences between archaia paideia and sophistry but they share 
one common feature in that they both “aimed at the attainment of arête” (Webster, 1973, 
p. 58). We have discussed how arête was taught under the old educational system, now 
our investigation focuses on discussing sophistry’s role in the education of arête. As 
Werner Jaeger puts it:  
Arête had from the very first been closely bound up with 
education. But as society had changed, so also had the ideal 
of arête, and with it the way to achieve arête. Everywhere 
in Greece, therefore, attention was now focused on the 
principal question: What type of education leads to arête? 
(Jaeger, 1939, p. 286).   
  
 One of the central tenets of the sophist is the possibility of teaching arête. The 
attainment of arête was central to being an Athenian citizen, and the sophists argue that 
arête could be attained through their training. As the cultivation of Athenian men 
necessitates an education in arête, if the sophists are correct, the cultivation of Athenian 
citizens encourages them to seek out the sophists. The Athenian’s aspirations to be 
among the kalos kagathos required that they live as virtuous men, which required that 
they learn to live virtuously. “The question is to whom shall they turn to form such a 
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traditional Athenian gentlemen, one who can manage his oikos or household, know how 
to honor his parents, and follow such upper-class properties as properly maintaining a 
web of guest-friendship…” (Robb, 1994, 200). The sophist argued that they had the 
ability to education the young men of Athens in matters of justice (dikē) and virtue 
(arête). This claim, however, caused tensions to mount between proponents of the two 
forms of Greek paideia.  
 Proponents of archaia paideia, such as Aristophanes, argue that sophistry simply 
teaches one to “argue a wrongful case and defeat the Superior Argument” (Clds, 884). 
Nevertheless a number of sophists, in particular Protagoras, were able to defend the claim 
that the sophistic method was capable of educating the youth in matters of virtue (arête).  
 What, then, is the defense of the claim that arête can be taught using the sophistic 
method? In Plato’s Protagoras, Hippocrates, a young man of Athens aspiring for political 
office, is accompanied by Socrates and introduced to Protagoras, a professed sophist and 
educator (317b2). Socrates inquires as to the benefits Hippocrates will gain in learning 
under the sophistic method (318a3), to which Protagoras responds, “you will go home a 
better man…Each day you will make progress to a better state” (318a6-8). Protagoras is 
here speaking of the attainment of arête, which confuses both Socrates and Hippocrates. 
Socrates comments, “I did not think this [arête] was something that could be taught” 
(319b). Socrates, says, “I used to think that it was by no human diligence that good men 
acquired their goodness, but now I am convinced” (Prot. 328e1). But the relationship 
between the poets and the sophists is not one of opposition so much as it is one of 
succession. To quote Werner Jaeger:  
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They [the sophists] were the heirs of the educational 
tradition of the poets; they were the successors of Homer 
and Hesiod…We cannot grasp their historical position until 
we give them their proper place in the history of Greek 
cultural education, as the inheritors of the poetic tradition 
(Jaeger, 1939, p. 296).  
 
Prior to the sophistic movement mimēsis celebrated the remembered glory (kléos) 
of a fallen hero, and in so doing, ethics and morality were communicated in a preliterate 
society. With the advent of literacy, individuals could be taught the names and ethos of 
Greek society through the interpretation of texts. The sophistic claim is more direct in its 
assertion, in that it professes to teach arête, but also — and more profoundly — that arête 
can be taught through textual analysis. This is only possible because of increasing literacy 
among the citizens of Athens. If the sophistic method is capable of teaching arête, the 
sophist must demonstrate how this method educates one in matters of virtue. This is done 
through the use of reason and the analysis of texts. The distinction, therefore, between the 
pedagogical practices of archaia paideia and the sophistic movement, made possible by 
the advent of Greek literacy, consists in different methods of attaining arête, and a 
fundamental difference in the appropriation of poetry, viz., a distinction between poetic 
mimēsis, in the case of archaia paideia, and textual commentary, in the case of “new 
education”.  
This is reflected in Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras. To illustrate that 
virtue can be taught, Protagoras offers a myth. One should not confuse the myth with a 
justification for his argument; the myth functions only to illustrate the logic that is 
implied from its narrative. Thomas Cole suggests that the myth offered by Protagoras “is 
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a reasonably accurate report of the Sophist’s teaching rather than an invention of Plato” 
(Cole, 1991, p. 60).  
Before mortals inhabited the earth, Prometheus and Epimetheus were given the 
responsibility of allocating powers to the creatures (320d3). Epimetheus distributed all 
the powers he had been given, without equipping the human race (321c). Upon this 
discovery, Prometheus “stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill in arts, 
together with fire” (321d). With these powers, humankind sought to establish cities and 
protect themselves from wild beats (322b-5). However, “when they gathered…they 
injured one another for want of political skill” (322b6). Thus, Zeus instructed Hermes to 
bring humanity the “qualities of respect [aidos] for others and a sense of justice [dikē]” 
(322c2) of which all were to share equally (322d).  
 The question arises as to the method or process wherein “everyone shares a sense 
of justice and civic virtue” (323a6). How is it that we come to share these powers? 
Protagoras dismisses the possibility that our capacity for sharing a sense of justice and 
virtue are innate (323c4), by pointing out that we do not hold those physically or mentally 
inept responsible for their ineptitude. For example, if a madman were to bite his 
caretaker’s arm, we would not be warranted in calling such an action unjust, as the 
madman is not accountable for his actions. He is not accountable because he cannot 
comprehend that his action is prohibited. Thus, if “everyone shares a sense of justice and 
civic virtue” and these characteristics are not innate, yet we hold competent persons 
accountable for their actions, then we are justified in punishing those who are competent 
for knowing that their actions are prohibited yet still perform the act (323e-324b4). 
However, “…to hold such a view amounts to holding that virtue can be instilled by 
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education” (324b5). That is to say, if the competent person knows that the action is 
punishable, and knowledge of this fact was not attained innately, then this knowledge 
must have been attained through one’s education, wherein the individual was taught that 
such an act is prohibited and punishable.  
What is at stake is the manner in which the sophistic method or “new education” 
professes to instruct individuals in matters of virtue. Both proponents of archaia paideia 
and the sophistic method defend the claim that virtue can be taught; what is at issue, then, 
is establishing the distinction between the pedagogical models. On the one hand, the 
sophistic method is justified by “proofs” as is evident in Protagoras’ language when 
discussing our shared sense of justice and virtue (323a5). On the other hand, the language 
of archaia paideia is radically different, and one does not speak of proofs and 
justifications, but of speaking and acting as a hero. How, then, is poetry used in the 
sophistic method as a means of argumentative justification? 
The pedagogical model of the sophistic movement required that its educators 
were “authorit[ies] in poetry” (339). For the sophists, poetry still played an essential role 
in the cultivation of arête and the sophists were known for their ability to interpret and 
analyze poems. Interestingly, however, poetic verse was still “performed” by sophists — 
though not in the sense of recitation. Josiah Ober notes, “Quotations of poetry and 
citations of historical precedent could enliven a speech and help to buttress the argument 
by the inspired wisdom of the poet and the authority of past practice. The technique held 
a great risk for the speaker however” (Ober, 1989, p. 178). With respect to the sophistic 
movement, in general, and its pedagogical model, in particular, citing poetry during 
public speech, whether presenting before members of the council or in a more intimate 
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setting, required that the sophist did not assume the “appearance of a well-educated man 
giving lessons in culture to the ignorant masses” (Ober, 1989, p. 179). The sophists might 
appear as such to their audience because of the sophists’ command of poetic texts; i.e., 
their ability to make “a special study of literature” (Ober, 1989, p. 179). They did not 
simply listen to the recitation of poetic verse. Clearly, this ability to engage in textual 
criticism was a definite argumentative advantage in a culture still captivated by the 
charms of poetic verse.  
Since few if any were so versed in the poetic tradition as to challenge a sophist 
outright, it would not ordinarily be a problem for the sophists if the content of the poetic 
verse was distorted to accommodate or justify a particular argument. Notoriously, 
however, Plato’s Socrates in the Protagoras was sufficiently versed in the poetic tradition 
and capable of arguing on matters of poetry. 
 The sections spanning 339-347 of Plato’s Protagoras are unmistakably his 
attempt to illustrate to his contemporaries that he too “can do poetry”. For our 
investigation of Ancient Greek paideia one should also note, as Jaeger writes, “In the 
history of the human mind, the sophist are a phenomenon quite as necessary as Socrates 
or Plato; in fact, without them, Socrates and Plato could never have existed” (Jaeger, 
1939, p. 291). Our focus in this section is not to argue whether sophistry is better or more 
thorough than philosophy, only to assert that, as a pedagogical model, the sophistic 
method regularly employed poetic verse in defense of its position. The incorporation of 
Socrates’ critique of the sophistic model is only used to illustrate the various methods 
sophists employed to counter such argumentative demands for justification. 
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Protagoras begins with the assertion that proficiency in poetic verse is an inextricable 
component of one’s education (339). Pertaining to their discussion of virtue, Protagoras 
initiates his conversation with Socrates in an analysis of a poem from Simonides, a poem 
that investigates the issue of virtue (339b). Perhaps, Protagoras asks, if Socrates is 
familiar with the poem or if he would have Protagoras recite it (339b3). It is unclear, 
however, when Socrates responds “I know it and have given it quite a lot of study” 
(339b4). The poem is merely a template that frames their discussion of virtue; the context 
of their conversation has as its conceptual boundary the content of the poem. Protagoras 
suggests that there is a contradiction in the poem (339d), to which Socrates responds, 
rather gracefully, by explaining the difference between being and becoming (340c4-
340d). The oscillation between retort and answer, within the confines of poetic verse, 
illustrates the functional capacity of poetry to accommodate “analytic” analysis, in the 
colloquial sense.  
Their discussion continues and Socrates further illustrates his point in an investigation 
of another verse. Rather than debating the content, however, Socrates and Protagoras 
resort to debating an interpretation of a word within the verse, viz., the word ‘hard’ 
(341a3). The verse is as follows:  
The gods have put sweat on the path to virtue, The 
summit’s reached, hard though it was, thenceforth the task 
is light (340d2-6). 
Various interpretations of the word ‘hard’ are offered (341b-c) and (341d-e). 
Protagoras rejects Socrates’ interpretation and justifies his own through a “proof” (341e), 
which relies on a proceeding verse from the poem (341e3). This level of specificity is a 
pedagogical advancement over passively receiving an orator’s recitation of the same 
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poetic verse, without the ability to specify meaning. Nevertheless, Socrates denies the 
claim that poetry is an effective pedagogical tool, as the sophists do not practice analysis 
and justification—both staples for philosophical thought—rather, their appeal to poetic 
verse presupposes that poetry functions as a representation of reality, which it does not. 
Since Socrates has demonstrated the inability of Simonides’ poem to educate one in 
matter of arête, Protagoras, in his appeal to this poem, cannot also profess to teach what 
Socrates has already refuted.  
To understand the sophistic movement one has to acknowledge the need for its 
existence, in that it served a particular function, and attracted a specific class of student. 
Sophists had a method of presentation and a lucid understanding of the cultural needs of 
the Athenian demos. In an explanation of how the sophists conducted business 
throughout Athens, we turn our attention to Plato’s Greater Hippias, wherein he writes: 
The eminent Gorgias, the Sophist of Leontini…spoke most 
eloquently before the Assembly…giving demonstrations to 
the young…he earned and took away with him large sums 
of Athenian money…our distinguished friend 
Prodicus…was much admired for his eloquence before the 
Council…he made an astonishing amount of money by 
giving demonstrations to the young…[Hippias brags]…I 
have made more money than any other two Sophists you 
like to mention, put together (Gr. Hipp, 282b-282e7).  
 
This form of education was essential for young Athenian males aspiring, as 
Hippocrates says, to “make a name” (316c) for themselves. The shift from archaia 
paideia to the sophistic method does not suggest that these systems of education are in 
any sense antithetical. In fact, throughout the latter half of the 5th century, boys with 
aspirations of becoming politicians (politikoi), after having completed their traditional 
education, had the option of entering political life, which required they become proficient 
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speakers and continue their education under the guidance of an accomplished sophist. 
Jaeger writes, “…the new problem of the connection between state and intellect…was to 
bring the sophistic movement into being…[that is]…of the relation between a great 
intellectual personality and the community in which he lived” (Jeager, 1939, p. 282). In a 
similar vein, Ober notes; “Skill in public address was sine qua non for the politician. This 
meant not only skill at putting words together but also in putting them across” (Ober, 
1989, p. 113). With only a few sophists and a city of young Athenian males aspiring for 
political office it is clear that sophists could earn large sums of money. Their ability to 
earn such high wages was directly correlated with the growing need for “professional 
speech” in the political arena. Thus, the need for a technical mode of speaking and a 
systematic analysis of speech and text, necessitated the development of the sophistic 
movement.   
 How, then, did sophists conduct their “business,” i.e., their exchange of 
knowledge for money? First, the sophist would give a public presentation of his rhetorical 
skills (282b5). T.B. Webster estimates that there could have been as many as 1,720 
eighteen-year-old Athenian males during the late fifth and early fourth century,44 as this 
age would have been prime to enter political office. With so many aspiring politicians 
and so few sophists to educate the young men on matters of statesmanship, it is to no 
surprise that they were capable of earning large sum of money.   
 Members of the Assembly must have encouraged this association between the 
sophist and the young men of Athens. A successful presentation before the heads of the 
city profited the sophist but also profited the city itself, as younger men, newly educated 
 
44 See Webster. 1973, p 61. 
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in the art of oration and rhetoric, would have inevitably replaced elder statesmen. The 
sophist, then, served an integral role in the preservation of the political infrastructure 
throughout Athens. 
Indeed this form of education would benefit all parties. Sophists would benefit 
from attaining a wage. The city would benefit because the newly trained student would 
possess the knowledge “not merely to obey the laws, but to create laws to guide the state” 
(Jeager, 1939. p. 290). Finally, the student would benefit in learning how to become a 
better man and citizen — in learning virtue — and a better politician in learning how to 
argue and reason. However, Plato adamantly opposes the sophists and Socrates 
effectively demonstrates the inability of sophistry to educate the youth in matter of virtue 
in his discussion with Protagoras. Sophistry fails as an educational model, insofar as its 
claims to truth are themselves contingent on the analysis and application of poetic verse 
and therefore fails to produce a logical proof. Poetry takes feeling good as attesting to 
truth (Waugh, 1991, p. 53); through context, however, one’s feelings are easily 
manipulated. Thus, Medea’s actions, for example, can be made to seem just, and as such, 
the weaker position defeats the stronger.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Eros and Education in the First Five Speeches of the Symposium 
Introduction 
 Throughout the last four chapters, we have discussed the role of Ancient Greek 
paideia in the education and “enculturation” of Athenian boys. Within the dialogues, 
Socrates challenges the claims of poetry, rhetoric and sophistry. Socrates, however, has 
not described which form of education can fulfill this goal. It is for this reason that we 
will analyze the Symposium as a dialogue both describing and defending a philosophical 
education.  
Phaedrus 
 In Phaedrus’ speech, the techniques of epic poetry are employed in praising Love. 
Within the Symposium, he represents the shortcomings of an education in the epic 
tradition. The hero, at the core of Homeric epic, is distinguished from the gods, as 
“Homeric epics operate on two planes, which form entirely separate worlds – the world 
of men and the world of gods” (Trypanis, 1977, p. 79). Phaedrus begins his speech with 
the claim that Love is a great god (178a7) and argues that there is no genealogy for the 
god of Love (178b). Unbegotten, the god of Love serves as the “creative principle,” 
wherein “all our highest good” is derived (178b5-c2). With respect to the world of men, 
Phaedrus asserts that for young men the greatest blessing they can receive is to attract a 
generous lover (erastēs), (178c).  
An inherent characteristic of the world of men is the need for society, as we are 
social beings, and the protection or expansion of values through war and conquest. 
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During battle, the epic hero is continually confronted with either choosing a homecoming 
(nόstos) or immortal fame (kléos), i.e., he is confronted with the choice of leaving the 
battlefield or dying in hopes of attaining kléos, yet one should never sacrifice one’s kléos 
for nόstos.45 This conception is perfectly represented in Phaedrus’ claim that,  
For the lover would rather anyone than his beloved see him 
leave the ranks or throw away his arms in flight – nay, he 
would sooner die a thousand deaths (179a-a4).  
 
If the beloved is “anxious to make a name for himself in the city” (Pro. 316c), and to 
accomplish this task requires the tutelage of a lover, any acts of transgression against the 
city would immediately nullify his “association” with his lover — as a means of 
safeguarding the lover’s reputation and honor. Therefore, not only is this form of 
education beneficial to the lover it is invaluably beneficial to the city. Phaedrus, 
representing the epic tradition, appeals to kléos, saying: 
for the very presence of Love kindles the same flame of 
valor in the faintest heart that burns in those whose courage 
is innate. And so, when Homer writes that some god 
‘breathed might’ into one of the heroes, we may take it that 
this is what the power of Love effects in the heart of the 
lover (my emphasis), (179a5-b3).46
 
 
45 See Gregory Nagy. The Best of Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaia Greek Poetry. 
(Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1979) p. 35-40. In Homer’s Iliad (22.100-110) Poulydamas 
urges Hector to retreat “the people to the city”, to which Hector refuses. The thought of their deaths lay 
heavy on his conscience and he imagines that the people will say, “it would have been much better to fight 
against Achilles, and to slay him, or else be killed by him before the city” (22.108-110). As Nagy writes, 
“For Achilles, the kléos of the Iliad tradition should be an eternal consolation for losing a safe return home” 
(Nagy, 1979, p. 29). In his confrontation with Achilles Hector proclaims, “Now death has come to me, let 
me not die ignobly without glory. Do something great so men will long remember” (Iliad, 22.300-305).  
46 Phaedrus’ reference to Homer’s Iliad supports the argument that his speech supports and 
defends various techniques of epic poetry. The goddess Athene is said to have breathed strength into 
Diomedes, wherein he was able to kill thirteen men single-handedly (10.560). It is important to note that 
Diomedes did not flee for nόstos and longevity but fought for kléos and immortality.  
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In so emulating these men, they, too, may attract the eye of a lover and receive an 
education, thereby attaining arête. Hence, the cycle is continued and the city ensures its 
survival with each repetition.  
Phaedrus suggested that we, as men, participate with immortality, through having 
the gods kindle the “flame of valor” (179a6) during our time of most need (in defense of 
the city). It is through this interaction with the gods that we define our existence in being 
honored by the gods (179e7). This honor, however, comes at a great cost as the “flames 
of valor,” breathed from the gods, cause men to sacrifice their lives in defense of both 
their city and their beloved. Thus, the lover is always near to the gods (180b), and will 
eternally be remembered for his glory and bravery in defense of his city and his beloved. 
Unfortunately, however, such honor is only attained in one’s death. 
Pausanias 
 Pausanias represents the shortcomings of an education received at the hands of the 
sophists. He employs the lessons of the sophists in justifying the practice of paederasty.47 
Bury writes, “…[Pausanias] is fundamentally a sensualist, however refined or specious 
may be the form in which he gives expression to his sensualism” (Bury, 1932, p. xxvi).  
Pausanias, a student of sophistry,48 begins by amending Phaedrus’ eulogy to love, 
claiming that there are two goddesses rather than one, viz., the heavenly Aphrodite and 
the earthly Aphrodite. (180d9-11). On his view, this distinction is critical as the 
conception of love varies from one goddess to the other. For Pausanias, since there are 
                                                 
47 See Neumann, Harry. 1964. “On the Sophistry of Plato’s Pausanias” in Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Phiological Association, Vol. 95. p. 261-267; R.G. Bury, The Symposium of 
Plato (Cambridge 1932); G.M.A. Grube, Plato’s Thought (Boston 1958).   
48 See, R.G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge 1932) p. xxxvii, and (Protagoras, 315d6), 
and finally, Neumann, Harry. 1964. “On the Sophistry of Plato’s Pausanias” in Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Phiological Association, Vol. 95. p. 264. 
 62
                                                
two goddesses, one heavenly and the other earthly, “it follows, then, that Love should be 
known as earthly or heavenly according to the goddess in whose company his work is 
done” (180e).  
 Pausanias argues that love of the earthy Aphrodite is the source that elicits 
“passions of the vulgar” (181b2). It is a confused love, attracting, as the object of its 
desire, both males and females. If a man is not steadfast and consistent in his actions, this 
reflects poorly on his character. Unregulated desire indicates one’s lack of sōphrosunē or 
temperance.49 For Pausanias, an act in itself “is neither good nor bad” (181a), of 
importance is the intention behind the act. He suggests “the outcome of each action 
depends on how it is performed” (181a2). Harry Neumann writes, “For Pausanias, the 
moral worth of spiritual love rests upon the lover’s intention. In itself no activity — 
including love — is noble or base” (Neumann, 1964, p. 262). Thus, a noble love seeks 
the heavenly rather than the earthly Aphrodite and is restricted by the law, which fosters 
action through punishment.50
The proper conception of love, then, according to Pausanias, is that of the 
heavenly Aphrodite. Pausanias says, “…heavenly Love springs from a goddess whose 
attributes have nothing of the female, but are altogether male” (181c). An erastēs will not 
take an ineligible boy as his erōmenos, i.e., a prepubescent boy.  
 
49 Note, it was frowned upon for a man to be a dedicated “homosexual” as he was expected to 
marry and have children. For example, Carnes writes, “the relationship between Pausanias and Agathon 
[referring to the Symposium] is said to violate the Greek protocol for age dissymmetry (Carnes, 1998, p. 
112), which demonstrates Pausanias’ commitment to sensualism.  
50 We have already spoken in detail about the regulation implemented in the palaestra, which 
sought to restrict the natural tendencies of the pedotribe, responsible for the education of young boys 
during the hours of dawn to dusk. See also, Marrou, H.I. 1956. A History of Education in Antiquity trans. 
George Lamb. New York: The New American Library. p. 175; and Plato’s Laws Bk. VII, 796a2-796b4 for 
the rules that govern ‘stand-up-wrestling’. See also, Aristophanes. 2000. Clouds trans. Peter Meineck, with 
an introduction by Ian C. Storey.  Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company. p. 67 for a continued 
discussion on conduct and legislation.  
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Previously, Pausanias has said, “that the action itself, as such, is neither good nor 
bad” (181a). Thus, the act of courting a boy is neither good nor bad, since it is not the act 
but the intention behind the act that determines its value. It is deemed a bad action 
because, “no boy can please [his erastēs] until he has shown the first signs of 
intelligence” (181d2). Pausanias claims, “there should be a law to forbid the loving of 
mere boys” (181e).51 In this statement he is both condemning the love of young boys and 
implicitly suggesting that such an act or propensity to act is natural, which would account 
for the need to legislate conduct. Pausanias knows, however, that no one can argue 
contrary to his position, for such an argument must refute the claim that intelligence is the 
true object of one’s love.52 An argument to the contrary would also be forced to defend 
the stance that it is the boy — himself — that is the true object of one’s love. On this 
argument, intelligence is unimportant, or at least secondary to the boy’s physical beauty, 
and therefore one would be justified in loving a boy if he did not show the “first signs of 
intelligence”.  
Pausanias, then, turns his attention to the just love of an erastēs with an erōmenos. 
The courting between an erastēs and his erōmenos is governed by a strict code of 
 
51  It is interesting to note what is said about Pausanias in the Protagoras, 
 
and beside [Prodicus] on the neighboring couch sat Pausanias from 
Cerameis and with him someone who was still a young boy — a lad of 
fine character I think, and certainly very good looking. I think that I 
hear that his name is Agathon, and I shouldn’t be surprised if 
Pausanias is particularly attracted to him (my emphasis),  
(Protagoras, 315e). 
 
Note that “the Protagoras takes place around 433 B.C., approximately sixteen years before the 
Symposium”, while Agathon was still a child. (Neumann, 1964, p. 262). While it is certainly not stated that 
Pausanias was the lover of a prepubescent Agathon, it is interesting to note that they were lovers during the 
time of the Symposium and their relationship “is said to violation the Greek protocol for age dissymmetry” 
(Carnes, 1998, p. 112).  
52 Though it appears that this is Pausanias’ position we will see that it is not, i.e., Pausanias does 
not hold true to the claim that intelligence is the true object of one’s love. 
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decency. The erōmenos cannot “yield too promptly to solicitation” or if his “surrender is 
due to financial [hardship]” (184a4, 184b); such a union is deemed immoral and they are 
held in contempt. This code of decency ensures that the submission of an erōmenos to an 
erastēs is “made for the sake of virtue” (184c4). Furthermore, Pausanias argues that, in 
the event that the erōmenos is “duped...there would still have been something noble in his 
mistake” (185a6-185b1), i.e., in the event that the erastēs is not a virtuous man but is 
perceived as such, and therefore courts a young erōmenos under the guise of education, 
even if this is discovered by the erōmenos, his mistake will still have been noble. For 
Pausanias, it is not the act itself but the intention behind the act; thus, the erōmenos, 
intending to further his education, in the pursuit of arête, would not be held morally 
culpable for his mistake — since his intentions were pure. Neumann writes, “Success in 
his enterprise will mean that boys allow themselves to be seduced in return for instruction 
in sound moral philosophy” (Neumann, 1964, p. 264). Keep in mind that the true object 
of Pausanias’ love, as he himself has claimed, is intelligence, which is a progression from 
Phaedrus’ argument in that the object of Pausanias’ desire is intangible; it is a concept 
rather than a person (allegedly). However, as we near the conclusion of his speech, we 
notice that the object of Pausanias’ desire is not intelligence at all but for the “lover to 
have his way” with the erōmenos (184e4, 185b5). Neumann writes,  
He would have them convinced that an upright character, 
honor, intelligence and trustworthiness are the ultimate 
desiderata…but [if] boys may and should do anything for 
the sake of spiritual progress…[then] This means that it 
would be disgraceful for them to reject Pausanias’ 
demands…[which] is meant to make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for his favorite to elude his sophistic wiles 
(Neumann, 1964, p. 264-265).  
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Thus, Pausanias’ speech is self serving as he has structured his argument so no shame 
may fall on a willing erōmenos who is duped by an erastēs, which ensures that as long as 
an erastēs appears to have an interest in the moral cultivation of the erōmenos, no blame 
can fall on either party. However, for Pausanias to suggest that “it is right for the lover to 
have his way” demonstrates that he is unconcerned with the pursuit of intelligence once 
he has justified his taking advantage of the erōmenos. For how could the erōmenos deny 
his erastēs erotic pleasure in exchange for a substantial education? If the erōmenos is 
duped and taken advantage of by the erastēs, then all is fair, since his intentions were 
just.  
Eryximachus 
 In Eryximachus’ speech there are three key points, all of which pertain to the 
Ancient Greek concept of the art of medicine. First is the nature of opposites (ἐναντί) 
and its relation to health (186b2-186d5); second, the reconciliation of these opposites in 
maintaining physical harmony (186d6-187e8); and finally, the cosmological nature of 
medicine and its relationship with the divine (188a-188e4).  
 Eryximachus, the physician, and son of Acumenus,53 begins his speech on love in 
agreement with Pausanias, insofar as one should desire a virtuous love and shun the 
desire for sexual gratification (186a-b1). He also argues that one should desire that which 
promotes health and soundness of mind, while avoiding sickness and over indulgence, 
                                                 
53 See (Phaedr, 268a8). Acumenus is also a physician (Phaedr, 227a4) and it is alleged, rather 
scandalously that Eryximachus and his father were, “implicated in the business of the “profaning of the 
mysteries” (Andoc. i. 35); at least, there was a certain Acumenus who was also among the denounced (ibid. 
i. 18) and the name is a very unusual one, so that it looks as though the denounced persons were our 
physician and his father” (Taylor, 1956, p. 216-217).  
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defining medicine as, “the science of what the body loves, or desires, as regards repletion 
and evacuation” (186c6-7).  
Eryximachus’ speech suggests that there should be a harmony of the body, which, 
in turn, requires the control of the soul over the body. Learning temperance and 
exercising self-control is the means of overcoming our vulgar desires. He establishes a 
series of empirical and binary oppositions such as “hot and cold, sweet and sour, and wet 
and dry” (Sym, 186d9). What significance do these oppositions have to the paideutic 
practice of the medical arts?  
Eryximachus states that he will defend his profession as a physician (186b2) in 
his praise of Eros. He hold true to his medical education by explaining the importance of 
opposites, stating, “bodily health and sickness are both distinct and dissimilar, and unlike 
clings to unlike” (186b5). In his commentary of Eryximachus’ speech, Alfred E. Taylor 
comments, 
The body is, in fact, composed of “opposites” which are at 
strife with one another, the hot, the cold, the dry, the moist, 
etc.; medicine is the art which produces “love and concord” 
between these opposites  (my emphasis), (Taylor, 1956, p. 
217).  
 
The second phase of Eryximachus’ speech discusses the reconciliation of these 
opposites, as he notes, “[we] must be able to reconcile the jarring elements of the body, 
and force them, as it were, to fall in love with one another” (my emphasis), (186d6). 
Similarly, it is stated that “what constitutes health is the equilibrium of the formative 
properties, wet, hot, dry, cold, bitter, sweet, and the rest” (fr. 51b).54 Health, as opposed 
to disease, is itself in opposition and is reconciled by a balance between “repletion and 
 
54 (Pseudo-) Plutarch, Tents of Philosophers 5.30 (Moralia 911 A-C), (Van der Eijk, 2000, p. 105). 
 67
                                                
evacuation” (186d). Eryximachus’ point is made clearer though Heraclitus’ analogy of 
musical harmony (186e1-187c5).  
The treble and bass both perform opposite functions in the creation of musical 
harmony, treble occupying higher octaves and bass those lower. Despite there contrasting 
function, treble and bass work in accord for the creation of musical harmony. 
Eryximachus says,  
medicine is under the sole direction of the god of love…the 
same holds good of music…harmony is due to the art of 
music, as the creator of mutual love and sympathy… 
harmony is concord, and concord is a kind of sympathy, 
and sympathy between things which are in conflict is 
impossible so long as that conflict lasts (186e, 187a, 187c2, 
187b3-b5). 
 
It is through reconciling the opposition of these two musical elements (treble and bass) 
that we experience musical harmony. If “harmony is concord”, and “concord is a kind of 
sympathy”, and sympathy is a resolution of conflict, then concord, too, is a resolution of 
conflict; and if “sympathy is a creation of music”, then, since “concord is a kind of 
sympathy”, concord, too, is a creation of music; moreover, since music is “under the sole 
direction of Love” and since concord is both a creation of music and a resolution to 
conflict, then Love is the concord of conflict.55 This extensive explanation is necessary to 
justify the claim that Love is the concord of conflict or of opposition. Thus, it is through 
Love that we find harmony, health and a balanced life. Later in his speech, Eryximachus 
says “Love brings together those opposites of which I spoke” (188a2).  
The conclusion of Eryximachus’ speech on Love encompasses the totality of 
creation. He falls victim to the same accusation of which he indicts Pausanias, saying, 
 
55 “Harmony is concord” (187b2). “Concord is a kind of sympathy” (187b2). “Sympathy is a 
creation of music” (187c3). “Concord is a kind of sympathy” (187b2).  
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“since Pausanias broke off, after an excellent beginning, without having really finished,” 
(185e7). Nevertheless, he begins his speech situated in empirical claims, and strict 
reason, and ends with muddled abstractions on the observation of astronomers tracking 
the movement of the stars (188b2-5) and claiming that Love governs the animal kingdom, 
vegetables, herds, crops, frost, hail, blight and even the seasons of the year (188a-b5).56 
Victoria Wolz captures the grandeur of his intellectual embellishment, writing, “…Plato 
might thus be said to present Eryximachus as a living example of those who, in words of 
Socrates in the Apology, “on the strength of their technical proficiency claim a perfect 
understanding of every other subject, however important” (Wolz, 1970, p. 332). Wolz is 
not alone in her suggestion as Ludwig Edelstein writes,  
How can medicine have taught [Eryximachus] that Eros 
rules not only men and animals and plants, but all things, 
human and divine alike? This assertion, it seems, indicates 
a rather ludicrous pride in the importance of the medical art 
and stamps Eryximachus as the prototype of the arrogant 
doctor (Edelstein, 1945, p. 89). 
 
Taylor’s view on Eryximachus is somewhat more charitable,  
 
We may…call [Eryximachus] a “pedant,” if we do him the 
justice to believe that the pedantry is, of course, part of the 
fun of the evening and is presumably intentional. The 
learned man is presumably amusing himself, as an eminent 
man of science might do to-day in an after-dinner speech, 
by making a little decorous “game” of his own professional 
occupation (Taylor, 1956, p. 217).  
 
In conclusion, then, it is important to note that, with respect to our investigation of 
the paideutic practices of Ancient Greeks, Eryximachus, unlike the previous two 
speakers, readily identifies his speech as emblematic of his professional education. There 
 
56 Note, this is even a violation of his own discipline since medicine teaches that the conception of 
human nature begins with the universe and gradually accounts for man (Jaeger, 1945, p. 306), whereas, 
Eryximachus succeeds in doing exactly the opposite.   
 69
is no question that his speech reflects the education he has received as a physician but as 
such reflects the shortcomings of an education in the medical arts. His speech serves as a 
template for understanding medical pedagogy, which, to be charitable, may account for 
concordance of empirical phenomenon, which is itself non empirical. Nevertheless, the 
shortcomings of his speech suggest shortcomings in the pedagogical model of medicine. 
Thus, neither epic poetry (Phaedrus), sophistry (Pausanias), nor the medical arts 
(Eryximachus) are sufficient educational models for young Athenian boys.  
Aristophanes 
Harry Neumann writes, “Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium has often 
been viewed as an ingenious, amusing example of Old Comedy…” (Neumann, 1966, p. 
420). In our analysis of Aristophanes’ speech, we will investigate the techniques of Old 
Comedy employed by Plato’s Aristophanes to “ridicule” those abstracted eulogies to 
Eros,57 in so doing, Aristophanes separates himself from the other speakers. K.J. Dover 
comments on the essential difference between Aristophanes’ speech and the three that 
preceded him,  
Every other speaker argues to some degree in abstract 
terms, even if the argument disguises itself, in traditional 
form, as an exposition of the attributes of a supernatural 
being. Only Aristophanes commits himself whole-heartedly 
to the particular and the perishable; he takes it for granted 
that and individual reunion with his unique, individual 
‘other half’ is an end in itself (Dover, 1966, p. 47).  
 
                                                 
57 Thus far in the Symposium, Phaedrus, Pausanias and especially Eryximachus, either denied the 
role of our embodiment (physicality, sexuality, genitalia, and reproduction) or have made reference to it 
only in passing.  Their laudations to Eros have abstracted love to concepts of “just love” (dikaios erōs), 
“just laws” (dikaios nomoi) and cosmological accounts of Eros. As we shall see, in Plato’s account of 
Diotima’s speech, sexual reproduction is important, though obviously not of sole importance. Kenneth 
Reckford writes, “The comic poet’s humor will clear the air of much abstraction and pretense inherent in 
the previous speech…” (Reckford, 1987, p. 90). 
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In Aristophanes’ speech (189c2-193d5) the first technique of Old Comedy 
employed is his claim that there originally was a third sex (189e). Dover notes, “We 
know that [the] mythological burlesque [was]…common in Old Comedy” (Dover, 1969, 
p. 139). Aristophanes says,  
the race was divided into three; that is to say, besides the 
two sexes, male and female, which we have at present, 
there was a third which partook of the nature of both…each 
of these beings was globular in shape, with…four arms and 
four legs and two faces (189d7-9, 189e5-190a1) 
 
 Zeus decided to sever the globular beings — because they are attempting to scale 
the heights of heaven” (190b5) — one from the other (190d), reducing their strength by 
half (190d1) but multiplying their number twofold (190d2), which unlike the eradication 
of the giants (190c2) preserves the “offerings and devotions” (190c4) the gods receive 
from their devotees. If, however, there is any trouble, Zeus will sever them again, “and 
they will have to hop about on one” (190d5-8). The moral, then, of the Aristophanic 
myth, is, first, “to fear, that if we neglect the worship of the gods, they will split us up 
again” (193a3) and second, “to make two into one, to bridge the gulf between one human 
being and another” (191d1-3). In his commentary of Aristophanes’ Birds, Dover writes, 
“The gods are treated…not as the august beings worshiped in hymns and processions to 
temples, but as Punks and Rumpelstilskins drawn from the nursery-stories of an 
unusually sophisticated, confident and irreverent nursery” (Dover, 1972, p. 30). The same 
technique is employed when Plato’s Aristophanes says, “[the gods] didn’t want to blast 
them out of existence with thunderbolts…because that would be saying good-by to all 
their offerings and devotions, but at the same time they couldn’t let them get altogether 
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out of hand” (190c1-5). The gods are characterized as indifferent to the human plight and 
the separation anxiety that identifies our struggle for happiness. 
The Aristophanic myth (189d5-193b6) also defies the conventional decorum of 
the previous three speeches, which is another essential characteristic of Old Comedy, 
because it makes direct reference to genitalia and sexuality, for one would be ill equipped 
to speak on a third sex without reference to genitalia. Reckford writes, 
[Aristophanes] is also bringing us home to our own bodies 
and the feelings associated with them. His special interest, 
of course, is human sexuality. Most obviously, he takes us 
downward from the head to (of course!) the genitals…we 
realize that the previous speakers had quite ignored these 
parts (Reckford, 1987, p. 72).  
 
For Aristophanes, sexual intercourse is important for the propagation of the species, 
“[Zeus] moved their members round to the front and made them propagate among 
themselves, the male begetting upon the female” (191c-c3) but as importantly, 
Aristophanes recognizes the ability of sexual intercourse to satisfy desire,58 “if man 
should conjugate with man, he might at least obtain such satisfaction as would allow him 
to turn his attention and his energies to the everyday affairs of life” (my emphasis), 
(191c5-c7). Dover writes, “The seizure of sexual opportunity is felt even more strongly to 
be the hallmark of a man, and the complete absence of inhibition in sexual word and deed 
 
58 This is not to suggest that the fulfillment of sexual desire is an end-in-itself for Plato’s 
Aristophanes, for such a categorization would be incorrect. He says, “…the purely sexual pleasures of their 
friendship could hardly account for the huge delight they take in one another’s company” (192c2-4). 
Reckford notes, “Pausanias and Eryximachus had not only taken an intellectual, or clinical, approach to 
sex. They had depersonalized it” (Reckford, 1987, p. 72). Aristophanes focus is not to exalt sex or even 
sexuality but to recognize its importance in who we are as human beings, which will factor in later 
speeches.  
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is one of the most striking features of Aristophanic comedy” (Dover, 1972, p. 38). Plato 
holds true to this characterization of Aristophanic comedy.59  
 Aristophanes was initially supposed to speak after Pausanias (185c6) but was 
smitten with a serve case of the hiccups (185c8) and deferred to Eryximachus (185d1), 
who suggested that he tickle his nostril to sneeze, which would cure his hiccups (185e1). 
After the conclusion of Eryximachus’ speech Aristophanes says,  
Yes, I’m better now, [speaking to Eryximachus]…but not 
before I had recourse to sneezing — which made me 
wonder, Eryximachus, how your orderly principle of the 
body could possibly have called for such an appalling 
union noise and irritation (189a-4). 
 
Remember, Eryximachus suggested that “harmony is concord” and a concord of 
opposites, yet his cure for Aristophanes’ hiccups called for a concord of “noise and 
irritation”, hardly opposites. Aristophanes seemingly undermines Eryximachus’ entire 
argument by using his error as the butt of a joke. Eryximachus even warns Aristophanes, 
saying, “Now, Aristophanes, take care…and don’t try to raise a laugh before you’ve even 
started.”(189a5). Too which Aristophanes, retracts his comment saying “I take it all 
back” (189b3). Aristophanes also makes Pausanias and Agathon the butt of a joke, 
Now I don’t want any coarse remarks from Eryximachus. I 
don’t mean Pausanias and Agathon, for all I know they 
may be among the lucky ones and both sections of the male 
(193b5-c1).  
 
Within the speech of Aristophanes, then, any number of paideutic elements, specific to 
Old Comedy, aid in the composition and characterization of his speech. Thus, if 
 
59 Plato’s Aristophanes makes reference to: privates (190a), members (191c), “sexual pleasures” 
(192c3), “satisfaction” (191c6) lesbianism (191e), the “virile constitution” “of the nation’s youth” (192a), 
and sexual position (191b8-c), just to name a few topic of discussion. Clearly, Plato holds true to the 
unabashed nature of comedy.  
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Pausanias and Agathon are truly happy, they have succeeded in surmounting separation. 
It is Eros, then, which has brought them together, as “[E]ros is the drive to overcome this 
unnatural bifurcation through a return to primitive integrity” (Neumann, 1966, p. 421). 
Agathon 
 The evening’s festivities are taking place at Agathon’s home (172a8) the day after 
he has won the prize for his first tragedy (173a9).60 He begins his speech by reminding 
his guests that their duty, in singing praises to Eros, “is first to praise him for what he is, 
and secondly, for what he gives” (195a6). Agathon, then, proceeds to describe the nature 
and characteristic of Eros, and to establish the benefaction to which we are recipients. He 
begins with his description of Eros, saying: 
[Eros] is the youngest of gods, which is proved by his 
flight…and his escape, from the ravages of time, who 
travels fast enough — too fast, at any rate, for us poor 
mortals (195a11-b1).  
 
 Agathon, then, amends his suggestion that Eros is immortal, to directly assert, 
“Love, in his imperishable youth, is…the youngest [god] of them all” (my emphasis), 
(195c), which correlates with his own daintiness and beauty,61 leading us speculate about 
the focus of his speech. Alfred Taylor writes,  
the theme of his discourse is to him no more than a peg on 
which to hang his garlands of language. There had been 
real feeling, under all the burlesque and the grossness, in 
                                                 
60 Despite Agathon’s prize for his first tragedy, none of his actual works remain in there entirety. 
Aristotle, however, in the Poetics, alludes to how wonderful a tragic playwright Agathon — the person — 
must have been, writing, “[the dramatization of the fall of Ilium in its entirety] was enough to ruin even a 
play by Agathon” (XVIII, 1456a15-20), suggesting that even a playwright, as prestigious as Agathon could 
not recover from such a mistake. Fragments of Agathons work are scattered throughout Aristotle’s Ethics 
(VI.2.1139b9-10), (VI.4.1140a19) and Rhetoric (II.19.1392b8), (II, 2.24.1402a10) but the largest segment 
of Agathon’s works are cited by Athenæus in The Deipnosophists, (V, § 1), (X, § 80), and (XII, §, 37). For 
a complete listing of the fragments of Agathon in the original, See: Nauck, August. Tragicorvm Graecorvm 
Fragmenta. (Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung) 1964. p. 763.   
61 (Protag. 315d), Th. 130ff., cf., Ar. fr. 326. 
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the speech of Aristophanes; from Agathon we get only 
“words, words, words” (Taylor, 1956, p. 222) 
 
Agathon is capable of using beautiful language to describe Eros, but there is no meaning 
in what he his saying. His encomium on Eros is self absorbed and reflects the 
shortcomings of an education in tragedy. His hymn to Eros also reflects how enamored 
he is with himself—he is the beloved, he is the object of Love’s desire and his encomium 
is given to demonstrate his rhetorical skills rather than to praise Eros. The loftiness of 
absurdity reaches its peak in the following quote,  
Moreover, his life among the flowers argues in himself a 
loveliness of hue, for Love will never settle upon bodies or 
souls, or anything at all where there is no bud to blossom, 
or where the bloom is faded. But where the ground is thick 
with flower and the air with scent, there he will settle…and 
there he loves to linger (196a9-b2).  
 
Indeed, art of this caliber manipulates both our perceptions and our reality. We 
misconstrue the wordiness of his speech as having sustenance, as we naturally tend to 
look for meaning. Unfortunately, however, no matter how deep one may dig, the bulk of 
Agathon’s encomium on Eros is utterly vacuous; this is not to suggest that it is without 
purpose. He says,  
[Eros] makes the dispositions and the hearts of gods and 
men his dwelling place—not, however, without 
discrimination, for if the heart he lights up be hard he flies 
away to settle in a softer (my emphasis), (195e2-5). 
 
The tragedy of his speech is his inability to look beyond his own beauty and 
accomplishments. He is essentially captivated, not with Eros, but with his own particular 
beauty, and softness and daintiness, since Eros only dwells in the softest of hearts. He is  
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able, then, to offer such praises to Eros because he, literarily, is the embodiment or 
receptacle of Eros. His softness and daintiness necessitate this “fact”.
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Chapter Six 
Socrates 
Socrates’ speech revisits a discussion with Diotima, a woman of Mantinea (201d) 
who “brought about the postponement of the plague of Athens” (201d2-3).62 It was she 
who taught Socrates the philosophy of Love (201d4-5) and her “method of inquiry by 
question and answer” that Socrates now employs (201e1-2). Until Socrates’ account of 
Diotima’s speech, the female played no participatory role in the encomiums on Eros.63 
Though this analysis is not a feminist account of Diotima’s speech, one cannot deny 
Socrates’ deliberate incorporation of the female, both in reference and in metaphor.64
 To begin, then, we must first discuss the parents of Love. Unlike Phaedrus’ 
creation mythology (178b), Diotima argues that Love was begotten from both a man, 
Resource, and a woman, Need (203b-c). Since, half Love’s parentage is of his mother’s 
(Need), he is neither delicate nor lovely, which refutes Agathon’s claim (196d1), as he is 
unshod, unkempt and nomadic. In, what will prove to be an important passage, Diotima 
notes: 
Love is never altogether in or out of need, and stands, 
moreover, midway between ignorance and wisdom. You 
must understand that none of the gods are seekers after 
                                                 
62 Saxonhouse writes, “by postponing it, though, the plague struck Athens during the 
Peloponnesian War, at a time when it would have the most devastating effects” (Saxonhouse, 1984, p. 20).  
63 Phaedrus suggests that “Love is unbegotten” (178b), Pausanias says, “But the heavenly Love 
springs from a goddess whose attributes have nothing of the female, but are altogether male” (181c1-2), 
Eryximachus dismisses the flute girls “let her play to herself or the women inside there” (176e5), the 
Aristophanic myth hold no affinity for propagation as Aristophanes comments, “They [male-male] have no 
natural inclination…to beget children”, and Agathon makes no reference to the female, as he is primarily 
concerned with himself.  
64 Clearly the reference is to Diotima, as it is her speech. The metaphor, as we shall see, is one of 
propagation (206c-212c) and the dual parentage of Love, viz., Resource (representing the male) and Need 
(representing the female).  
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truth. They do not long for wisdom, because they are 
wise—and why should the wise be seeking the wisdom that 
is already theirs? (my emphasis), (203e3-204a3). 
 
 In a previous part of his speech, Socrates demonstrates that one cannot want or desire 
what one already has (200c-d). Rather it is to be said that what one has, one desires to 
preserve (200d3). Similarly, the gods do not desire wisdom, for they are already wise. 
With respect to ignorance, however, Diotima comments, 
Nor…do the ignorant seek the truth or crave to be made 
wise. And indeed, what makes their case so hopeless is that, 
having neither beauty, nor goodness, nor intelligence, they 
are satisfied with what they are, and do not long for the 
virtues they have never missed (my emphasis), (204e3-7) 
 
 This passage is the first indication that the focus of Diotima’s speech is not only Love 
but also education. First there is the distinction between wisdom (σοφία), on the on 
hand, and ignorance (άγνοια ) on the other. In her speech to Socrates, Diotima suggests 
that one can “be made wise” (204a4). Thus, she implies that there is a process or a 
method, wherein one “can be made wise”. Such a process is paideia. Her account of this 
process, then, is an account of paideia. It is the account of how one goes about attaining 
wisdom, how the acquisition of wisdom unfolds. Second, every form of education 
considered in our analysis: poetry, sophistry, music, rhetoric, the medical art, comedy and 
tragedy, all professed to teach virtue, arête. Virtue was a staple in Athenian education and 
among the kaloi kagathoi—of which Socrates’ audience is largely composed—virtue was 
taught under the institution of sunousia, the “association” between an erastēs and his 
erōmenos. Thus, it is to no surprise that Diotima says, “[they] do not long for the virtues 
they have never missed”, in other words, “one cannot miss what one does not know”. It is 
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through education, then, that one comes to know. On Diotima’s view, the ignorant are 
guilty of misology, a hatred of wisdom or the desire “to be made wise”. 
 The question is posed by Socrates, “who are these seekers of truth, as they are 
neither the wise nor the ignorant” (204a8-9), to which Diotima responds, “They are those 
that come between the two, and one of them is Love…Love is the lover of wisdom” (my 
emphasis), (204b2-5). Without an understanding of Ancient Greek paideia this statement 
makes little sense. How can Love be a lover of wisdom? If, however, we interpret this 
statement, under the pedagogical language of sunousia, Love is the “lover” or companion 
of wisdom, which is the beloved. One is now able to understand the significance of 
Diotima’s otherwise opaque statement that she is “not altogether surprised at [Socrates’] 
idea of [Love], which was, judging by what [he] said, that Love was the beloved rather 
than the lover. So naturally [he] thought of Love as utterly beautiful, for the beloved is in 
fact beautiful…” (204b8-c1). Two points of clarification are needed. First, remember that 
Socrates says, “[Diotima] used the same argument on me that I’ve just brought to bear on 
Agathon” (201e4-5). Socrates proves Agathon wrong, demonstrating that “Love has no 
beauty, but is lacking in it” (210b3), to which Agathon professes, “I did not know what I 
was talking about” (201c2). Second, Diotima informs Socrates that it is natural to think of 
Love as the beloved because “the beloved is in fact beautiful” (204c2-3). Neither 
Agathon nor Socrates “[knew] what [they] were talking about”. How can Love be the 
beloved (204c1) if to be the beloved Love must be beautiful (204c2-3), and as Diotima 
demonstrates to Socrates and Socrates to Agathon, “Love has no beauty, but is lacking in 
it” (201b3). Love cannot be the beloved, because to be the beloved is to be beautiful, and 
love is not beautiful, “but is lacking in it”. Diotima successfully shows the contradiction 
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in Socrates’ reasoning, as Socrates uses the same tactics, which he learned from Diotima, 
to refute Agathon. 
 If, however, Love is not the beloved but the lover, and to be the lover is to be the 
educator, then Love cannot be educated, rather, Love educates. Thus, if it is correct to 
suggest that Diotima’s discussion with Socrates pertains to paideia, the first lesson in 
being “made wise” is the recognition that Love has the capability of educating its 
beloved. If love educates, then love as described by Diotima, will not follow the 
active/passive model of the erastēs and the erōmenos. This will become clearer later in 
the dialogue. 
Since, Love lacks beauty (201b3) and “everything longs for what it lacks” 
(200a8), it follows that “[Love] is longing to make the beautiful his own” (204d6). 
Hence, beauty is the object of Love’s desire, because “[h]e’ll gain happiness” (204e5-6) 
— as an end in-itself — since there’s no need to ask why men should want to be happy” 
(205a1).    
 As for the lover, Diotima comments: 
I know it has been suggested…that lovers are people who 
are looking for their other halves [(191a4-5)], but as I see 
it, Socrates, Love never longs for either half or whole of 
anything except the good [and]…Love longs for the good 
to be his own forever (205d8-206a9). 
 
This is obviously a critique of the Aristophanic myth, but more importantly, Diotima has 
established that the object of Love is the Good, and the Good cannot be attained in the 
here and now, for it is an eternal longing, “Love longs for the good to be his own 
forever”. Diotima now poses the most important question of the dialogue to Socrates, 
asking, “…what course will Love’s followers pursue?” (206b). As those pursuing Love 
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are forever pursuing the good, and Love is the lover (erastēs) rather than the beloved 
(erōmenos), and the educator rather than the educated, then “Love’s followers” (206b)—
philosophers—are forever pursuing education, for they are educators insofar as they seek 
sophia and teach others to seek it as well. Socrates is dumbfounded by her question and 
pleads for her to respond. Diotima says, “To love is to bring forth upon the beautiful, 
both in body and in soul” (206b6-7).  
Paideia and the Ladder of Love: A Pursuit of Immortality through Education 
 Diotima describes for Socrates what course Love’s followers should pursue. She 
suggests that “when we reach a certain age our nature urges us to procreation” (206c2-3). 
Novel in our analysis of the Symposium thus far, is the suggestion that the female plays a 
participatory role in the pursuit of Eros. Prior to Diotima’s remark, none considered the 
role of the female as bearing any importance in their encomia on Eros. Aristophanes even 
went so far as to suggest that descendents of the male-male “have no natural inclination 
to marry and beget children” (192b). For Diotima, however, the importance in 
procreation is not gestation but conception. She asserts,  
Conception, we know, takes place when man and woman 
come together, but there’s a divinity in human propagation, 
an immortal something in the midst of man’s mortality 
which is incompatible with any kind of discord (my 
emphasis), (206c4-7).  
 
Diotima suggests that “there is a divinity in human propagation” (206c5). She has 
set to define what the others have failed to accomplish, namely, what that “something” is, 
i.e., the vehicle wherein we all, men and women alike, participate in immortality.65 
                                                 
65 With the exception of Aristophanes, the previous speakers, though ignoring the importance of 
conception, did acknowledge love’s connection to immortality. Phaedrus suggested that we, as men, 
participate with immortality through, having the gods kindle the “flame of valor” (179a6) during our time 
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Interestingly, she is able to correlate the conception of propagation not only with the 
female but also with the male. She says, “when the procreant is big with child, he is 
strangely stirred by the beautiful” (206d6-7).  
 To understand what the procreant is pregnant with, one must first recognize that, 
for Diotima, propagation not only refers to biological propagation it also refers to the 
propagation of one’s self through an ability to “[call] something into existence that was 
not there before” (205b9-10). Hence, “…this [ability] is the one deathless and eternal 
element of our mortality” (206e7-8). Diotima concludes this initial phase suggesting,  
since we have agreed that the lover longs for the good to be 
his forever [(206a9)] it follows that we are bound to long 
for immortality as well as for the good—which is to say 
that Love is a longing for immortality (206e8-11).  
 
In relation to paideia, the desire for immortality is equally as intense as the desire for 
biological propagation. The fact that we have the ability to “[call] something into 
existence that was not there before” (205b9-10), whether in the form of the creation of art 
or prose or scientific discoveries, suggests that we equally posses the ability to propagate 
our ideas, and through them seek immortality. Diotima notes that “[t]he application of the 
principle to human knowledge is even more remarkable” (207e5). Just as we change over 
time, from infancy to old age (207c9-207e4), so too does our knowledge change, i.e.,  
things we know increase, while some of them are lost, so 
that even in our knowledge we are not always the same, but 
 
of most need (in defense of the city). Pausanias suggests, “the lover whose heart is touched by moral beauty 
is constant all his life, for he has become one with what will never fade” (183e6-8), Eryximachus suggests 
that it is the “art of divination, with its powers to distinguish those principles of human love  that tend to 
decency and reverence, is, in fact, the source of concord between god and man” (188c5-d), Aristophanes, 
firmly grounded in the flesh, makes no reference to immortality at all. Agathon’s entire speech was filled 
with suggestions of the youthful immortality of Eros (195c) who “makes the dispositions and the hearts of 
gods and men his dwelling place” (195e2-3). As we have demonstrated throughout the previous chapter, all 
these suggestions are flawed in there reasoning. 
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the principle applies as well to every single branch of 
knowledge (207e5-9).  
 
Thus, the transition from recognizing that “there is a divinity in human propagation” 
(206c5) to our ability to “[call] something into existence that was not there before” 
(205b9-10) coupled with “a longing for immortality” (206e10) posits knowledge as an 
object of desire. We know that we have the ability to create, something that would 
otherwise not exist, like an epic poem, or piece of art. We also know that through 
biological propagation our progeny will replace our generation. In the creation of an idea, 
as in the creation of biological progeny, we leave something that will remain in existence 
after our deaths. Hence, it is through the act of creation both biological and conceptual 
that we aspire for immortality. This aspiration, however, on the conceptual level, requires 
life-long-education, i.e., unlike archaia paideia, the philosopher must have no end to her 
desire for learning. In archaia paideia one is capable of mastery, which allows one to 
progress into the political realm after basic education. Diotima particularly notes, 
however, the difference for the philosopher, 
When we say we are studying, we really mean that our 
knowledge is ebbing away. We forget, because our 
knowledge disappears, we have to study so as to replace 
what we are losing, so that the state of our knowledge may 
seem, at any rate to be the same as it was before (207e9-
13). 
 
The purpose for our fevered and life-long pursuit of wisdom is that we are unlike the 
gods, who are already wise (204a1-3); we are neither ignorant nor wise, but rest 
somewhere in between (204a8-9). Thus, is the object of our eternal desire the wisdom of 
the gods. In so aspiring, however, we must commit ourselves to a life of education and 
learning, and in the process leave behind our creation, i.e., our speeches and treatises, 
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paintings and music, and so forth. “This…is how the body and all else that is temporal 
partakes of the eternal” (208b). Diotima is not denying that we will die; rather she insists 
the philosopher, too, can aspire for immortality, without having to resort to death. 
Through the conception of life and propagation, the notion that only kléos—immortality 
as the subject of song—can give one immortality has been refuted. There should no 
longer be a need for a speech such as this: 
Yet you who are still of age to beget children must bear up 
in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will 
they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will 
be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security (my 
emphasis), (Thucy. 2.44).  
 
In Pericles’ funeral oration, the reason to “beget children” is so that the city may use 
them as “a reinforcement and a security”, i.e., in their eventual deaths, in defense of the 
state, they will achieve immortality through the pursuit of their love of honor (philotimia) 
and fame (kléos). Diotima says, “men’s great incentive is the love of glory, and that their 
one idea is, ‘To win eternal mention in the deathless roll of fame’” (208c4-6). She refers 
to Alcestis’ sacrifice for Admetus (208d), which directly relates to Phaedrus’ speech 
where he uses the same example (179b6). Thus, unlike the pursuit of kléos, the 
propagation of ideas through one’s longing for wisdom, allows one to attain the same 
end, immortality, without having to resort to death.  
 Diotima continues her discussion of wisdom asserting that “the most important 
kind of wisdom” is “that which governs the ordering of society” (209a6-7). Society, for 
the Ancient Greeks, is ordered by many things, including the practice of sunousia. It 
would be incorrect to suggest that Diotima is arguing that we do away with the 
institution, she is not; she is arguing that we should transform it. Instead of looking at the 
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temporary relationship between an erastēs and his erōmenos as an end in-itself, i.e., as 
the end to Greek paideia, we should, “undertake the other’s education” (209c1). In so 
doing, we begin our assent up the “ladder of love”. The erastēs “will fall in love with the 
beauty of one individual body” (210a9). Through the practice of sunousia the erastēs 
falls in love with the beauty of his erōmenos, but this is not as Pausanias suggested an 
end-in-itself (183e8). Diotima says, “his attention should be diverted from institutions to 
the sciences…he will be saved from a slavish and illiberal devotion to the individual 
loveliness of a single boy, a single man, or a single institution” (210c6-d2). A liberal 
education functions as the best pedagogical method for educating the youth. This 
contemplation and interaction with various bodies of knowledge eventually culminates 
with the recognition of “one single form of knowledge, the knowledge of [B]eauty” 
(210d6-7), which is “an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes…for such 
beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as now” (211a-3). Thus, the “ladder of 
love” begins with individual instances of beauty, then progresses to the recognition of a 
multiplicity of beauties, including beautiful institutions, then to learning and learning in 
general “until at last he comes to know what beauty is” (211c7).  
 The “ladder of love”, however, does not simply end once one attains knowledge 
of what beauty is. The suggestion that it does, fails to recognize that virtue, for the 
Ancient Greeks, was a foundation for education. Instead of teaching virtue through the 
kléos of epic heroes, we are now equipped to teach virtue through the “ladder of love”, 
described above. Thus, it is the truth “and not the seeming” (212a2) that teaches virtue.  
Diotima’s speech culminates with the following: 
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for it is virtue’s self that quickens him, not virtue’s 
semblance. And when he has brought forth and reared this 
perfect virtue, he shall be called the friend of god, and if 
ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be 
given to him (212a2-6). 
 
The Speech of Alcibiades: The Death of Archaia Paideia: (213c4-223d11) 
 Alcibiades bursts in drunk, and offers a speech. Though there is no debate about 
his intoxication, there is much truth in his words. He says, “Drunkards and children tell 
the truth — drunkards anyway” (217e2). Rather than follow custom and present a eulogy 
to Love, Alcibiades presents a eulogy to Socrates, as he is emblematic of the true lover, 
the lover of wisdom—the philosopher—that Diotima described. Alcibiades’ speech is an 
encomium to Socrates. Alcibiades says, 
Socrates went out in the same old coat he’d always worn, and 
made less fuss about walking on the ice in his bare feet than we 
did in our shoes. So much so, that the men began to look at him 
with some suspicion and actually took his toughness as a 
personal insult to themselves (Sym. 222b2-4). 
 
Compare Alcibiades’ statement with that of Pericles:  
On the one hand, the friend who is familiar with every fact of 
the story, may think that some point has not been set forth with 
that fullness which he wishes and knows it deserves; on the 
other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to 
suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own 
nature. For men can endure to hear others praise only so long 
as they can severally persuade themselves of their own ability 
to equal the actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy 
comes in and with it incredulity (my emphasis), (Thuc.1951, p. 
103). 
 
And finally Alcibiades adds,  
 
Anyone listening to Socrates for the first time would find his 
argument simply laughable: he wraps them up in just the kinds 
of expressions you’d expect of such an insufferable satyr…But 
if you open up his arguments, and really get into the skin of 
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them, you’ll find that they are the only arguments in the world 
that have any sense at all, and that nobody else’s are so godlike 
(221e-222a2). 
 
This echoes Diotima’s remark that, “if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it 
shall be given to him [the true lover]” (212a5). If we agree that Socrates is the true lover, 
then we must agree that he will be in some sense immortal. We have learned that Love 
was begotten from Resource and Need, it is Need that serves as the condition for the 
possibility of desire, because one cannot desire what one already possesses. It is through 
Need that we come to seek immortality. Continually Socrates denies himself pleasures 
that were all too accessible to him, including Alcibiades (219c-4). He refuses to escape 
from prison (46c1-2) when given the opportunity by Crito, (46a7-9), he refuses to 
succumb to his “wild beast appetite” when confronted with Charmides’ astounding 
beauty, (155d2-e3), he refuses to remain silent and lead an unexamined life, (38a3) when 
given the opportunity of exile, he even refuses to simply wait until sunset to drink his 
hemlock  and dies with “the sun still upon the mountains” (116d7-e1). One achieves 
immortality, then, through a philosophical education, by leading a life of continual 
questioning, by seeking answers, by communicating with others. The relationship 
between the teacher and the student, from Archelaos to Socrates, from Socrates to Plato, 
from Plato to Aristotle, from Aristotle to Theophrastus and so on is a preservation of 
thought. Despite the fact that these men have long since died, the theories they unmasked, 
the questions they asked, are timeless, and as such, they too are immortal. 
  Philosophy is the culmination of the Ancient Greek pedagogical model. The 
“association” of sunousia and archaia paideia — as an end — is shown to fail in 
Alcibiades’ inability to learn from Socrates’ instruction. Alcibiades remains under the 
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assumption that it is the erōmenos who is beautiful and the object of desire, as an end, 
which is but the first rung on the “ladder of love”. Alcibiades says,  
you have my eulogy to Socrates, with a few 
complaints…about the unspeakable way he’s treated me. 
I’m not the only one, either; there’s Charmides, and 
Euthydemus, and ever so many more. He’s made fools of 
them all, just as if he were the beloved, not the lover 
(222a6-10).  
 
It is not that Socrates cannot recognize the beauty of these men but that he recognizes 
their beauty as merely an instantiation of the form of Beauty. In surrounding himself with 
beautiful men and various forms of knowledge, Socrates begins his progression up the 
“ladder of love”. It is to no surprise, then, that “[Socrates] had the insolence, the infernal 
arrogance, to laugh at [Alcibiades’] youthful beauty and jeer” (219c-2). Alcibiades 
should realize that his eulogy to Socrates is misplaced because even Socrates is no end in 
himself. But Alcibiades never really grasps this, saying to Agathon, “I’m telling you this 
for your own good, so that you’ll know what to look out for, and I hope that you’ll learn 
from our misfortunes” (222b2-3).  
 In conclusion, then, philosophy, a “friend of wisdom”, is the life-long pursuit of 
knowledge, attained through continued questioning and conversation, wherein our love of 
learning inspires, within us, the desire to propagate our ideas. Philosophical dialogue in 
which all participants are lovers, and therefore active, is the means of propagating these 
ideas, and in so doing, these procreants attain immortality. The erōmenos—the Good 
itself—acts on the philosophers as they are drawn up the Ladder of Love. Unlike the epic 
heroes in pursuit of the same end, willing to sacrifice their lives for honor and glory, the 
philosopher attains immortality through the generation of life and ideas, rather than its 
 88
destruction. So it is that we are still in conversation with Socrates made immortal in 
Plato’s dialogues.  
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